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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Soccer played a central role in Uruguay’s national identity throughout the 20th century. 
The national team’s triumphs in the first half of the century were seen as proof that the 
small nation could perform on a world stage. The mutually reinforcing relationship 
between soccer success and national identity weakened after 1950 when the national team 
stopped winning and when it entered into profound crisis in the 1990s as Uruguayan star 
players began leaving the country to play in better leagues abroad. The national team no 
longer provided the country with glory and the players were no longer mirrors of 
Uruguayan society. Through his 2006 project, Óscar Washington Tabárez tackled both of 
these problems. This thesis looks at how his institutional reforms and reinvention of the 
Uruguayan national team's image allowed for the modernization of the team as well as 
the emergence of a new relationship between national identity and soccer. This study 
serves as an example of how a peripheral soccer country can adapt to the changes of 
global commercialization, retain its national identity, and remain competitive. 
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Introduction 
 In November 2009, I walked into my father’s study and caught him grinning. He 
looked up at me and told me that Uruguay had qualified for the 2010 World Cup. Dad 
and I had always bonded over my club and high school soccer games, but I had never 
shared his passion for Uruguayan soccer. Seeing my lack of enthusiasm, he added that 
qualifying was a big deal for Uruguay. I congratulated him and changed the topic. A 
month later, as we ate Christmas Eve dinner in Barcelona with family friends, my father 
pointed to the television as a highlight reel of a blonde player in a red and white striped 
jersey came on and said, “that is Diego Forlán. He is Uruguayan and one of the best in 
the Spanish league.” I looked up and saw that Forlán played for Atlético Madrid, a team I 
had never heard mentioned in the United States, and looked away uninterested. I felt no 
connection to this Uruguayan player; I was a fan of Barcelona, the only team whose 
games I had ever seen on television in the United States. Barcelona was the only team 
whose players I knew and felt inclined to support.  
 After watching Uruguay’s first World Cup game with my dad in early June, I 
began to read articles on the players and watch interviews on YouTube. As the 
tournament progressed, I started to skype my family in Uruguay after each match to hear 
about the excitement on the streets of Montevideo. By the semifinals I was so invested 
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that I spent my days reading comments on FIFA.com articles just to see what people 
around the world were saying about the Uruguayan squad. Six months after shrugging off 
Forlán, I cried while watching the live coverage of the Uruguayan national team’s return 
to Montevideo, because I wanted to be there; I wanted to be with my cousins, aunts, and 
uncles in the streets of Uruguay welcoming the very same players that months before I 
had considered irrelevant to my life. I knew that I had undergone a deep change in the 
previous month. I felt a connection and a comfort with Uruguay and my family there that 
I had not felt since moving away in 2001. After years of suppressing my Uruguayan 
identity, struggling to find topics of conversation with my family in Montevideo, and 
refusing to read in Spanish or practice the language, I had begun to spend hours each day 
listening to Uruguayan radio talk shows, reading the national newspapers, and calling my 
family members at home. The team had built a bridge for me.  
 It was the intensity of the connection that I felt to the 2010 Uruguayan team, a 
connection that developed in just weeks, that led me to spend these last four years 
studying the role of soccer in Uruguayan society. The 2010 World Cup team had a lasting 
impact on my life, leading me to join the Ole Miss Honors College’s World Cup Initiative 
and choose a thesis topic about Uruguayan soccer. The experience had strongly 
influenced my identity, but I wondered whether the ‘new’ national team had strengthened 
other Uruguayans’ sense of national identity, as well. My revitalized connection with 
Uruguay stemmed from the interviews, social media posts, and behavior of the national 
team; how had these mediums allowed me to develop such a strong connection to the 
group even while living in Mississippi? Why was this group different from previous 
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teams? These are the questions I have researched for the past four years and the ones that 
led me to focus on the relationship between the Uruguayan national team and fans for my 
thesis. 
 Soccer has always been a point of pride for South American countries. It has been 
one arena where they have been able compete on equal footing with Europeans. Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay won half the World Cups held in the twentieth century; those 
victories enriched the national narratives of these countries. By the 1990s, however, the 
commercialization of club soccer in western Europe led to changes in global soccer that 
detrimentally affected all South American clubs and, eventually, national teams. Through 
partnerships with corporations, television rights, and merchandise sales, European clubs 
transformed soccer into a profit-driven industry. These advancements caused a 
divergence between the quality of South American and European clubs, resulting in the 
transfer of South America’s top players to the European leagues.  
 In 1995, the Bosman ruling exacerbated the disparity between the two continents. 
The ruling caused a massive increase in the salaries offered by top European clubs, while 
also loosening the restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed on all European 
club rosters. This facilitated an international labor market for professional soccer players 
of all levels. Promising players began to leave the southern continent at younger and 
younger ages, meaning they lived most of their lives abroad and rarely played with their 
compatriots; this challenged the cohesiveness of South American national teams. The 
high transfer rates also caused South American clubs’ quality of play to decline; teams 
began to be comprised of promising, young players waiting to be scouted, individuals 
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that were not good enough to play abroad, and older players that returned after their 
careers abroad had ended.  
 In this study, I focus on how global commercialization of soccer affected 
Uruguay, a small country of 3.5 million people whose success on the soccer field had 
been an important part of its national identity. With few battles and historical figures to 
commemorate, Uruguay derived many of its most revered heroes and epics from the 
soccer fields. Due to the global commercialization of soccer, Nacional and Peñarol, the 
country’s largest clubs, became export factories in the 1990s. As players left the country 
at younger ages, became more affluent as European club salaries increased, and 
transformed into celebrities due to an increasing commercialization of the athletes’ 
image, Uruguayans no longer identified with their national team players as they once had. 
The players were not simple or humble; they were not mirrors of the Uruguayan society. 
Uruguayans asked themselves: were these players actually representatives of the small, 
South American country, or of their flashy affluent clubs abroad? 
 Uruguayans’ questioning of the national team players’, and thus the team’s, 
Uruguayaness challenged the connection between soccer and national identity in 
Uruguay. How could a group of soccer players living outside the country and playing by 
the rules of the global market be the symbol of a soccer nation with a glorious past? If we 
think of national identity as “a shared sense of nation-hood grounded in the images and 
stories associated with an identifiable nation-state”, then the Uruguayan national teams of 
the past had helped create that shared sense of nationhood for Uruguay.  Their triumphs 1
 Jay Coakley and Mojca Doupona Topič, “Sport and National Identity: The Case of Latin America”, ALESDE, 2010: 2.1
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were the images and stories that contributed to the country’s shared story. Uruguayans 
“learn(t) these images and stories and use(d) them to (a) express their connection with the 
larger collectivity, and (b) identify others as members of that collectivity or as 
outsiders”.  the national team, whose predecessors had helped create that imagined 2
collective, was no longer identified as a member of that collective, but rather as a group 
comprised of outsiders. Place had always been central to national identity, so as national 
team players began to spend the majority of their careers abroad, the relationship between 
the national team and Uruguayan national identity flagged.  
 After being hired as the Uruguayan national team coach in 2006, Óscar Washington         
Tabárez implemented a long-term project to reinvigorate the national team, which 
accepted the realities of the world of globalized soccer, included a strong focus on the 
team’s public image, and tried to find a novel way for the national team to contribute 
images and stories to the Uruguayan national narrative. Tabárez knew that the players’ 
transfers at young ages and high quality lives abroad were unavoidable in a world of 
globalized soccer. Thus, his reforms aimed to improve the on the field results of the 
Uruguayan national squad, known as La Celeste, but they also attempted to redefine the 
relationship between the national team and Uruguayans in the new transnational context. 
He sought to show that although the players lived abroad with high quality lifestyles, they 
were still a symbol of Uruguay and that thus, the national team still contributed to the 
country’s shared sense of nation-hood. Through his reforms, he hoped to show that even 
 Ibid.2
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in the new transnational context, the national team could still be a pillar of the Uruguayan 
national identity.   
Chapter Structure 
 The opening chapter of this thesis introduces the global commercialization of 
soccer and their effects on South American soccer, in general. The chapter summarizes 
the changes that English soccer underwent in the early 1990s, which transformed it into 
an industry focused not only on winning, but the maximization of profit. I then go on to 
discuss how the commercialization of the sport and the Bosman ruling led to similar 
changes all around Europe, causing the salaries and quality of infrastructure of the top, 
elite European club teams to improve dramatically and European club players to become 
affluent international celebrities. The second half of the chapter concentrates on how the 
global interconnectedness created by global player markets and television placed South 
American countries in direct competition with these affluent European clubs for players 
and fans. The chapter ends with a discussion on the impact of the disparity between 
European and South American clubs.  
 Seminal texts such as Sociology of Football by Richard Giulianotti and 
“Recovering the Social: Globalization, Football, and Transnationalism” by Giulianotti 
and Roland Robertson provide the historical and sociological foundation for the study. I 
then use articles, such as “The Neoliberalization of Football: Rethinking Neoliberalism 
Through the Commercialization of the Beautiful Game” by Sam Dubal and “Soccer in 
the Age of Globalization” by Osvaldo Croci and Julian Ammirante to discuss the 
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commercialization of the sport, the implementation of free market principles, and the 
changes in the transfer market. I utilize these texts to connect the major issues of 
commercialization, globalization, transnationalism, and national identity with respect to 
soccer. Specifically, I discuss how the spread of goods and people brought about by 
globalization led to the development of a transnational culture and challenged national 
identity. Finally, I utilize several case studies on specific countries, such as Argentina and 
Chile to show how these changes affected South American countries. 
 The second chapter focuses on how the global commercialization of the sport 
affected Uruguay, specifically. First, I summarize the role that Uruguayan soccer and the 
national team held in constructing the foundation of the Uruguayan national identity in 
the early twentieth century. After covering the importance of soccer in the national 
identity, I explain the effects of the global commercialization on Uruguayan soccer in the 
1990s, such as the decline of Uruguayan clubs, like Peñarol and Nacional, the exodus of 
players abroad, and the resulting strained relationship between the national team players 
abroad and the Uruguayan public. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how 
players’ life of luxury and perceived lack of effort for the national team led to the 
questioning of their dedication and passion to Uruguay as a nation. 
 For Chapter Two, I utilize scholarly and journalistic articles that concentrate on 
the early decades of Uruguayan soccer and its role in the development of its national 
identity. For the 1990s, the information largely stems from books such as Yo Paco: un 
antes y después del fútbol uruguayo by Mario Bardanca and La Crónica Celeste by Luis 
Prats. To demonstrate how the players abroad were portrayed and perceived during that 
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time period I draw from the following sources: the Gallup Poll conducted after the 1990 
World Cup, Luis Cubilla’s famous 1991 interview, Uruguayan television clips from Juego 
Limpio after the 1994 Qualifiers, and international press articles. Unfortunately, the main 
Uruguayan newspapers, El Observador and El Pais, do not maintain an online archive for 
years before 2000, and there are no accessible holdings of these two papers in US 
libraries. For the years after 2000, in contrast, I was able to use their online archives, 
although they are cumbersome to use for lack of search functions. I looked through each 
day’s sport’s section for the years 2001-2011 and consulted all of the articles that were 
about the national team. 
 The third chapter dissects the institutional changes implemented after 2006 by 
coach Tabárez to overcome the negative effects that global commercialization had on the 
national team and to redefine the relationship between the team and Uruguayans. His 
reforms were aimed at improving the team’s performance, but also creating greater 
identification with the national team.   First, I delineate the difficult conditions faced by 
Uruguayan star players when they played for the national squad: the lack of friendlies and 
poor infrastructure. Then, I discuss Tabárez’s long-term proposal from 2006 that aimed to 
restructure the youth divisions, overhaul the national team image, and provide continuity 
through the establishment of team policies. After describing his plan in detail, I finish the 
chapter by highlighting the on-the-field results that his project produced.  
 The main sources for Chapter Three are official documents authored by Tabárez, 
such as his 2005 speech at the Uruguayan Soccer Museum, “The Formation of the Soccer 
Player,” and the 2006 project proposal entitled “The Institutionalization of the Processes 
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of the National Teams and the Formation of their Players”. I utilize articles from El 
Observador and El País as a source for details on Tabárez’s project and its results. I also 
draw from an array of interviews with Uruguayan players and public figures about the 
Tabárez Process that is found in El Camino es la Recompensa: Conversations with Óscar 
Washington Tabárez. 
 The fourth chapter looks at how Tabárez’s push for a new player profile 
strengthened Uruguayans’ identification with the players. I begin the chapter with a 
description of the changes that occurred on the national team during the Tabárez years; 
the squad became more professional and presented itself as more humble, attentive to 
fans, and actively involved with society. The new style improved the intra-team 
chemistry and camaraderie, as well as the public perception of the players. The second 
part of the chapter analyzes how the Uruguayan Football Association employed media to 
improve the national team’s image. Television ad campaigns allowed players to endorse 
Uruguayan products, while also highlighting their own positive values and patriotism. 
Social media and television provided channels for players to showcase their patriotism 
and the Uruguayan aspects of their everyday lives abroad. I conclude the chapter with a 
discussion on how Tabárez’s off-the-field changes improved fans’ relationship with the 
Uruguayan team. 
 I depend on post-2010 newspaper articles published in El Pais and El Observador, 
Fútbol y Otros Deportes by Ricardo Piñeyrua, and video clips from Pasión Mundial, 
Camara Celeste, and Por la Camiseta to trace the changes that occurred after 2006. El 
Camino es la Recompensa: Conversations with Óscar Washington Tabárez is again a 
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main source. I also used quotes from the television sports show, La Hora del Deporte, 
from before and after the 2010 World Cup to show the complete reversal of the media 
portrayal of Tabárez and the players from a critical, questioning one to praiseful and 
lauding. Finally, I utilize advertisements from several Uruguay companies to show the 
players’ involvement in marketing campaigns. 
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Chapter One: The Global Commercialization of Soccer and National Identity 
 On March 22, 2015, Lionel Messi, Neymar Santos, and Luis Suárez led the Nike 
and Qatar Airways sponsored FC Barcelona to a 2-1 victory over the Adidas and Fly 
Emirates backed Real Madrid in front of a crowd of over 98,000 people and an estimated 
television audience of hundreds of millions.   For the match, Lionel Messi and Luis 1
Suárez sported Adidas cleats, while Neymar wore Nike ones due to their personal 
endorsement deals that complement their combined 78.6 million dollar annual salaries 
with an additional 43.5 million dollars.  The sky-high incomes of top players, the 2
dominance of foreign players on most club rosters, the modern stadiums with ever-higher 
ticket prices, the reliance on television revenue, and the central role of sponsorship deals 
are all part of soccer today, but these are recent developments. Professional clubs have 
always been businesses, but it was not until the 1990s that they understood themselves as 
global companies focused on marketing and establishing a brand.  
Commercialization: Merchandise, Sponsors, Television, and the Bosman Ruling 
 The globalization of soccer permitted for the rapid evolution of the sport. 
Globalization refers to the intensification of global economic, financial, and cultural 
 Pete Jenson, “Barcelona 2-1 Real Madrid: Luis Suárez scores El Clasico winner…,” Daily Mail UK, March 22, 2015. 1
 Christina Settimi, “Cristiano Ronaldo Edges Lionel Messi As The World's Highest-Paid Soccer Player,” Forbes, May 2
16, 2015. 
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flows that create an increased interdependence between countries.  According to 3
Robertson, globalization in the last five decades has been driven by rapid advancements 
in technology and digital communication, the mitigation of trade and financial barriers, 
and the emergence of an international labor market.  The loosened borders and the virtual 4
proximity provided by technology has permitted an increase in the movement of goods, 
capital, and people which, in turn, has connected the world to the point that a global 
culture has emerged. Globalization of soccer in the 1990s was accompanied by the 
commercialization of the sport, the infiltration and promotion of market-driven ideology 
and profit-maximizing business models into the sporting realm.  This study will refer to 5
the processes of globalization and commercialization as global commercialization.  
 The commercialization of soccer began in England, but had global effects. During 
the Thatcher years,  English soccer clubs began to concentrate on profit maximization, 6
transforming soccer into a commodity, a cultural product that could be bought and sold to 
consumers. In the 1980s, the English game had been infamous for its problems with 
violence and infrastructure. In order to tackle these issues, in the early 1990s, all of the 
standing space in stadiums was eliminated and replaced with seating areas.  The 7
renovations improved security at the stadium as expected, but also decreased the supply 
of tickets available, increased the comfort and splendor of the stadiums, and raised ticket 
prices. The stadium renovations helped quell the hooligan problem by converting soccer 
 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (SAGE Publications,1992), 8.3
 Richard Giulianotti and Roland Robertson, “History: The Global Sport and the Making of Globalization” in 4
Globalization & Football (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2009), 5.
 Sam Dubal, “The neoliberalization of football: Rethinking neoliberalism through the commercialization of the 5
beautiful game,” International Review for the Sociology of the Sport, 126.
 Croci Osvaldo and Julian Ammirante, “Soccer in the Age of Globalization”, Peace Review (1999): 499. 6
 Dubal, 126.7
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into a luxury good. Croci and Ammirante explain that the renovations “… led clubs to 
begin to look at supporters as consumers to whom one could sell more than simply a 
match.”  The stadium refurbishments and the increase in ticket prices occurred at the 8
same time as the creation of the English Premier League which began its trajectory in 
1992 with a lucrative deal with BSkyB for 304 million pounds over five years for 
television rights.  The English league “characterized by deliberate moves by top clubs to 9
exploit their position as global brands, to maximize profit… and to attract corporate 
hospitality and the professional classes” became the new business model for professional 
soccer.   10
 The financial success of the new model promulgated similar shifts in the rest of 
Europe; however, South American countries were unable to follow suit. The 1990s were a 
positive economic time for Europe; the opening up of the East led to new trade partners 
and economic opportunities, so countries were able to invest time and resources in more 
lavish areas, such as the soccer industry. South America, on the other hand, was only 
transitioning to neoliberal policies at the time; the continent was too preoccupied with 
recovering from the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s to dedicate funds and attention to their 
declining soccer teams. South America did not have the resources to match European 
soccer developments and thus, a widening disparity between the sport in Europe and 
South America emerged. 
 Croci and Ammirante, 499.8
 Jason Rodrigues, “Premier League football at 20: 1992, the start of a whole new ball game,” The Guardian, February 9
2, 2012. 
 Rex Nash, “The Sociology of English Football in the 1990s: Fandom, Business, and Future Research”, Football 10
Research Unit (2000): 50. 
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 These changes marked the emergence of soccer clubs as businesses competing in 
two arenas: game results and finances. Club finances increasingly influenced game 
results, because clubs with higher funding were better able to improve infrastructure and 
rosters.  As the 1990s progressed, game days became even less central to the club as 
ticket sale earnings began to comprise smaller portions of clubs’ revenue due to the 
growing importance of television rights and merchandise sales.  Clubs began to sell 11
diverse products with the emblem and colors of the team, such as jerseys, scarves, flags, 
and hats to their fans in Europe, developing a brand and turning the club itself into a 
commodity to be consumed.  The clubs’ brands have continued to grow in value in the 12
twenty-first century as their reach has expanded with increased television coverage and 
the opening of retail stores worldwide. A prime example of the growth is Manchester 
United, which in the middle of the nineties was bringing in twice as much with 
merchandise sales and logo licensing than with game day sales and that by early 2015 
had a brand value of $446 million.   13
 While clubs depended on the sponsors for revenue, sponsors relied on the popular 
clubs for the creation of an emotional and cultural identification between the public and 
their products.  The intensification of the relationship between corporations and soccer 14
occurred when companies began to sponsor jerseys.  Currently, more than 687 million 15
 Wes Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?,” Business of Soccer, 2014. 11
 Croci and Ammirante, 499. 12
 Croci and Ammirante, 499.; Mike Ozanian, “The Forbes Fab 40: The World’s Most Valuable Sports Brands 2015,” 13
Forbes, October 22, 2015. 
 Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?”.14
 Ric W. Jensen, Nicolas D. Bowman, Brian V. Larson, and Yawei Wang, “Looking at Shirt Sponsorships From Both 15
Sides of the Pond: Comparing Global Trends Versus America’s Major League Soccer”, Soccer & Society (2013): 2.
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euros of the top European leagues’ revenue comes from jersey sponsorships,  with the 16
largest deal being Adidas’ 10 year $1.28 billion partnership with Manchester United.  17
While jersey sponsors may have sparked the relationship between corporations and 
soccer clubs, sponsorships can be found in other forms as well, such as Barclay’s 50 
million euro deal for the league naming rights for the English Premier League and 
BBVA’s 20 million euro naming deal with La Liga, the Spanish club league.  As clubs 18
became associated with specific brands, like Manchester United and Chevrolet or Chelsea 
and Samsung, players followed a similar path, endorsing products and representing 
corporations to the point of becoming the recognizable face of the companies. As clubs 
and players became more successful, both on the field and financially, sponsorships 
increased and the clubs became wealthier, making their brand value grow even further.  
 Cornel Sandvoss argues in A Game of Two Halves that the most important 
contributor to the globalization of soccer during the last few decades was television, 
because it “fundamentally altered notions of ‘here’ and ‘there’.”  Color, satellite, and 19
high definition television allowed for quality international coverage of European 
matches, permitting soccer fans around the world to follow European club teams. 
International fans’ novel interest in the European league allowed clubs to target the global 
consumer market and sell their jerseys and apparel worldwide. Clubs’ widened global 
reach and increased popularity made them “golden marketing vehicle(s) for regional 
 “Premier League clubs see 36% rise in shirt sponsorship income,” ESPN, February 24, 2015. 16
 Kurt Badenhausen, “Manchester United Kit Launch Generates Millions in Social Media Value For Adidas,” Forbes, 17
August 5, 2015. 
 “European Soccer Leagues’ Revenue From League Naming Rights,” The Statista Portal.18
 Cornel Sandvoss, A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television, and Globalization (Routledge, 2003), 2.19
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brands across the globe.”   Television contracts increased the appeal of clubs to 20
sponsors, commercial revenue due to international fandoms, and the brand value of the 
clubs overall, while also being their second largest source of revenue, an estimated $2.7 
billion dollars annually for Europe’s largest leagues.   21
 Merchandise, sponsorships, and television contracts increased the wealth and 
power of European clubs, but it was not until the mid-1990s that players’ salaries began 
to reflect that new reality. In 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of Jean-
Marc Bosman in a court case against the Belgian league. Bosman’s contract had ended at 
RFC Liège in Belgium and although he wanted to leave for Dunkerque in France, he was 
unable to do so since his club refused to accept the transfer fee that the French team was 
offering.  It was as if Bosman’s expired contract had held a non-compete clause for the 22
entire soccer industry; unless the Belgian team agreed to a fee, Bosman could not join 
another team. The Bosman ruling stated that clubs could no longer charge transfer fees 
for players whose contracts had expired,  since any laborer who became unemployed 23
had the right to find a new employer. 
 The Bosman ruling improved the salary and rights of top players at the expense of 
clubs, especially smaller clubs. Before 1995, top clubs had seen their revenues shoot up 
in comparison to their costs; after the Bosman ruling, they had to spend some of that new 
income to retain or acquire their best players. Since players could refuse to renew their 
 Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?”.20
 “Revenue from broadcasting rights of the Big Five European soccer leagues in 2013…,” The Statista Portal.21
 Robert Simmons, “Implications of the Bosman Ruling for Football Transfer Markets”, Economic Affairs (1997): 13.22
 Stefan Késenne, “Youth Development and Training after the Bosman Verdict (1995) and the Bernard Case (2010) of 23
the European Court of Justice”, European Sport Management Quarterly (2011): 548. 
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contract and leave clubs for free, clubs were forced to offer lucrative wages and perks in 
order to retain players at the end of each contract.  If the renewal contracts were not 24
attractive enough, clubs had to accept a transfer fee from another club before the players’ 
contracts expired or risk losing the players without even receiving a fee. If a club was 
wealthy, then it could utilize its income from merchandise and sponsorships to offer the 
players an irresistible offer and force the other clubs to present very large offers to buyout 
players’ contracts. Smaller clubs were unable to offer these lucrative contracts and thus 
were forced to accept any decent offers or risk losing their players for free at the end of 
their contracts. They became a type of farm teams — they developed young, promising 
players and then sold them to the more elite clubs for relatively low transfer fees. Along 
with increasing their power and salaries, the Bosman ruling changed the players’ 
relationship to clubs. Prior to the court ruling, players often remained at one club for their 
entire career, but after it, players moved around as the transfer market mandated. This 
challenged the sense of loyalty that had previously existed between players, their clubs, 
and their fans.   25
 The commercialization of soccer in Europe had a sizable impact on South 
American soccer since the increased global flows of people and information allowed 
players and fans to abandon local teams for the better situated European clubs. When the 
Bosman Case caused an increase in both wages and transfer fees for elite players in 
Europe, the elite European clubs were able to use their large revenues to adjust. South 
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American clubs, similarly to the small European clubs, did not earn as much revenue 
from merchandise, sponsorships, or television rights and thus, were unable to adjust to 
the Bosman ruling’s ramifications. South American clubs could not offer players the 
wages or working conditions that Europe’s best teams could, so they too became farm 
teams. Rather than benefitting from merchandise sales and television rights, South 
American clubs became dependent on the sale of players. This became an exodus, 
expanding from the transfer of top players straight to elite European clubs to the more 
systematic transfer of young talent to smaller clubs abroad that later sell the players to 
elite clubs if the players continue to thrive. In 2010, Argentina alone exported almost 
1,000 players to all divisions of the top European leagues and more than 1,200 to other 
leagues around the world.  This creates a vicious cycle in which the transfer of players 26
abroad lowers the quality of league play in South America, which deters fans from 
attending local matches and in turn hurts clubs and forces them to keep selling players. 
 The spectacle of European soccer does not only attract South American players, 
but also South American fans. Satellite television, high definition coverage, and live-
streaming websites allow South Americans to watch the coverage of the European 
leagues along with the lower quality, national coverage of local clubs that are technically 
lacking.  Pablo Alabarces explains that for Argentinians, television coverage confirms 27
“that their domestic game is excluded from these new global arenas.”  Luis Prats writes 28
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that in Uruguay, “international soccer steals the domestic audience…kids ask their 
parents for a Barcelona or Bayern Munich jersey, and know way more about Zlatan 
Ibrahimovic and Cristiano Ronaldo than they do about Wanderers or River Plate’s 
forwards.”  Fans are no longer limited to following and identifying with lackluster local 29
clubs; they can watch star-studded teams like Barcelona and Real Madrid play in multi-
million dollar stadiums in high definition every week.  30
 National Identity in the Globalized Soccer World 
 In the early 20th century, South American soccer players were perceived as local 
heroes that represented the country. A player’s respected qualities were aspects of his 
character that were thought to represent the nation: leadership, glory, respect, decency, 
and perseverance.  The commercialization in the 1990s changed the player from the 31
“traditional, local, and in most cases proletarian hero, to the modern global star product 
of Western cultural imperialism and neo-liberalism.”  Successful players became 32
wealthy celebrities and hence, instead of human qualities and national attributes, what 
came to define them were their affluence and image. Their celebrity status was exploited 
by corporations that utilized them as public faces; this disassociated the players, their 
success, and their achievements from the country and reattached it to companies’ 
commercial brand.  Players’ new celebrity status and wealth caused fans to feel 33
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abandoned. In The Neoliberalization of Football, Sam Dubal shares a quote from a fan 
that is contrasting the contemporary players to those of the past by saying “you saw them 
getting on a bus. The same bus as the fans… you wouldn’t get that now. Just, ‘go away 
little boy’, it would be that kind of attitude. And that’s how it has moved away from the 
fans.”   34
 Along with the general distancing between fans and athletes as the latter became 
affluent, distant celebrities, the mass transfer of players to Europe jeopardized the 
relationship between many South American players and national fans. South Americans 
from countries with rich soccer histories struggled to identify with players that lived most 
of their lives abroad with wealthy lifestyles and that only played at home during a few 
national team matches each year.   As players left to have more lucrative careers in 35
Europe, “under-performing athletes (were) often judged from a moral aspect in the public 
discourse.”   Fans who felt abandoned by their national players questioned the players’ 36
passion and dedication for the country and accused them of being sell-outs and wealth 
seekers who gave “allegiance to clubs rather than nation.”  Instead of seeing their 37
players as transmigrants, migrants who “develop and maintain multiple relations….that 
span borders”,  fans saw their players as migrants who chose to leave South America 38
behind. The players’ adoption of European tactics and luxurious lifestyles was seen as a 
betrayal of their national identities.  
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 Joshua Nadel, a Latin America and Caribbean historian, expands on this idea with 
the example of Lionel Messi, an Argentine who has won FIFA player of the year five 
times and is recognized as the best player of the world: “Critics accused him of seeming 
lost on the field with the national team… so used to playing with the world’s best on 
Barça, these critics said, he was unable to adapt… at home Messi was faulted for not 
‘feeling the Argentine jersey…In short, Messi did not play the way he was expected to. 
He did not play la nuestra, the Argentine style.”  Nadel goes on to add that even though 39
Messi turned down Spanish citizenship in 2004 in order to be able to play for Argentina, 
he is still often labeled as a foreigner. This issue is not unique to Messi. The accusation is 
made against most of Argentina’s national team members that play abroad; they are 
accused of having “lost Argentina’s supposedly innate style of play.”  The criticism is 40
rooted in the fact that Argentinians are expected to play a la nuestra, just like Brazilians 
and Uruguayans are expected to play with the styles of futebol arte and garra charrúa, 
respectively. Nadel concludes that the national style is “embedded in the way that Latin 
Americans think about both their soccer and themselves.”   41
 Lloyd Wong and Ricardo Trumper, Canadian sociologists, present a contrasting 
case to Nadel’s Argentina one. Iván Zamorano was a Chilean soccer player that played 
abroad for more than half of his soccer career in top clubs in Switzerland, Spain, and 
Italy. Unlike Argentinian players who are often accused of being “foreigners”, Zamorano 
was seen as a successful transmigrant representing Chile abroad. Fans did not think of 
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Chilean players’ transfers abroad as them abandoning the nation, but rather as them 
following the forces of the global economy. Chile did not have a history of soccer 
accomplishments, so the transfer of players to the the elite European leagues was seen 
“not so much as the deterritorialization and transnationalism of players, but rather as a 
marker of the increasing improvement of Chilean commodities abroad.”   Even though 42
he was wealthy, lived in Europe, and had multiple nationalities, Zamorano was a “core 
element in the making and remaking of the edifices of Chilean identity.”  This was 43
thanks to his “ineffable Chilean demeanor and personality that (had) not been corrupted 
or refined by the profits.”  Since the media played many of his games from Europe, 44
Zamorano “… was still playing in Chilean living rooms…He played at the same time for 
Internazionale and, by being a Chilean, for Chile.”  Zamorano and other Chilean soccer 45
players in Europe were points of pride for Chile; they were proof that Chileans could 
compete in the outside world. 
 Argentina and Chile present two opposing ways that South American countries 
have perceived the exodus of their players and the emergence of transnationalism, an 
interconnection of people and groups across borders, that has accompanied recent 
globalization.   National identity is based on shared imagery and stories, so when soccer 46
players, members of society that had once been protagonists of the shared national 
stories, are far away and living a different lifestyle, their relationship with the imagined 
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community is threatened. For that reason, Argentina, a country that once had a strong 
internationally renowned league and had consistently fought for the World Cup title, sees 
players’ emigration and the rise of a transnational culture as “the collapse of the 
mythological coupling of soccer and nation.”  The players are seen as foreigners, 47
immigrants who have chosen another style and way of life over the Argentinian ones. On 
the other hand, the Chilean players’ experiences abroad are taken as Chilean stories and 
images; they are part of the national narrative and contribute to the country’s national 
identity. The Chileans, who did not have a strong soccer history, see their players as more 
of transmigrants; they live and adopt European qualities, but are still seen as Chilean. 
Zamorano and other athletes “embody transnational cultural and capitalist business 
practices, and at the same time, willingly serve as national cultural icons for the 
formation and reaffirmation of national identities.”  Chileans do not see the players’ 48
transfers as them giving up their Chilean characteristics, but as them going out into the 
world to represent Chile.  
 The cases of Argentina and Chile are examples of opposing interpretations by 
scholars of the global commercialization’s effects on national identity and soccer. As 
globalization has progressed, scholars disagree over whether national identity and soccer 
culture have become damaged, reimagined, or strengthened by globalizing trends. Some 
scholars argue that the shift of importance from national to international has led to the 
dulling of the “radiance of the nation”, the breaking down of identities, and the 
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weakening of national unity.  These scholars can point to cases like Argentina’s where 49
global commercialization has threatened the relationship between soccer and national 
identity;  the players that were once symbols of the nation are now perceived as 50
“foreigners”. Others insist that external pressures have been met with measures seeking 
to reaffirm the peculiarities and uniqueness of the nations. These scholars, on the other 
hand, look to countries like Chile that have utilized their citizens’ success as a source of 
national pride. Jean Harvey states that “the global does not mean the disappearance of the 
local… globalization has been accompanied by an explosion of nationalism.”  Countries 51
have reacted to the transnational and global homogenization by emphasizing the local and 
national, fortifying old identities or cultivating new ones in relation to the new global 
setting.  Some countries, and governments, in particular, have sought to affirm current 52
national identities through soccer nationalism or worked to construct new distinct 
identities through soccer in the new global context.   53
 The last decade of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a new business 
model for professional soccer, a profit-maximizing model that relies heavily on 
merchandise sales and sponsorships. The commercialization of the sport began in 
England, but the interconnectivity provided by television and the international labor 
market spurred by the Bosman ruling caused it to spread throughout Europe. European 
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soccer became a spectacle: multi-million dollar brand values, stadiums, and salaries; it 
drew fans and players from around the world. Due to the size of their local market and 
their inability to develop an international following, South American clubs were not able 
to keep up with the changes in Europe and thus lost players and fans to Europe. This 
weakened the identification between the fans and the players in countries with rich soccer 
histories and challenged the role of soccer in South American national identities.  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Chapter Two: From Local Heroes to Repatriados 
  
 Throughout the last century, soccer has held a central place in Uruguayan society. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, soccer victories gave Uruguayans a rallying 
point and a common culture; they contributed many of the stories and images on which 
Uruguay’s shared sense of nationhood was founded. The celebrated national team players 
were everyday Uruguayans, struggling proletariat, that prevailed against larger and richer 
countries with dedication, passion, and garra charrúa, the characteristically Uruguayan 
drive to overcome unlikely odds and improbable situations. The glory fostered a close 
relationship between national players and soccer fans, who saw the players as worthy 
representatives of the country’s characteristics. Soccer became an important element of 
the Uruguayan identity; it provided the country with heroes and epics that “fill the 
vacuum of a country that feels itself an orphan of History.”   When the national team no 1
longer had the same success in the second half of the century, initially soccer continued to 
be a prevalent identity marker for Uruguayans due to national clubs’ success in 
international competitions. By the 1990s, however, with the national team and the 
national clubs nowhere near their old glory, the relationship between the distant, wealthy 
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superstars and Uruguayan fans began to deteriorate, challenging the historic role of the 
national team in the Uruguayan national identity. 
Uruguay’s Early Glory Days 
 Soccer’s importance in Uruguay is due to the national team’s success during the 
first half of the twentieth century. In 1924, the Uruguayan soccer team won the country’s 
first Gold Medal in the Olympic Games.  Four years later, Uruguay returned to the top 2
spot of the podium, confirming that the best soccer in the world was being played in 
South America. The national team’s success in the 1920s led to the country’s hosting of 
the first FIFA World Cup in 1930, which it also won.  Uruguay returned to the World Cup 3
stage in 1950, making it to the final game of the round robin tournament and defeating 
the host nation, Brazil, 2-1.  The victory continued Uruguay’s undefeated streak in 4
international competition and marked the culmination of its glory days. 
 Government support contributed to the quick improvement and success of 
Uruguayan soccer in the early twentieth century. In Soccer in Sun and Shadow, Eduardo 
Galeano explains that “Uruguay’s success at the ’24 and ’28 Olympics, and its 
subsequent World Cup victories in 1930 and 1950, owed a large debt to the government’s 
policy of building sports fields around the country to promote physical education.”  In 5
1913, there were only two fields in Montevideo. Fifteen years and two Olympic Gold 
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medals later, there were 118.  Additionally, it was the government established newspaper, 6
El Dia, that “transformed the triumphs of the amateur team at the Olympic games in 
Colombes (Paris) into a national gesture.”   On the day of the 1924 victory, the 7
newspaper described the players as symbols of the nation with language that could be 
found in a national anthem:  
“You are Uruguay. You are now the homeland, boys ... They all stand, move forward 
gallantly, determinedly inflating their chests … Finally seeing, far away in the distance, 
swaying proud ... soaked in the blue of space ...receiving from the sun its golden 
streams ... the emblem of that almost invisible dot on the map ... which has been growing, 
growing, growing.”   8
After the 1924 and 1928 victories, the government offered to host and fully fund the first 
FIFA World Cup in 1930 in order to celebrate the centennial of the signing of the 
constitution and connect the growing national sentiment around soccer to the country’s 
political history.  9
 The soccer victories of the first three decades of the 1900s “played an important 
role in fostering a more unified nationalism” by “help(ing) integrate new populations and 
provid(ing) the nation with a national - as opposed to political - rallying point.”  The 10
pride generated by success transformed the national team into a common cultural symbol 
for Uruguayans. Andrés Morales wrote that when the national team won the 1930 World 
Cup, one was not “from Montevideo, nor the interior, nor creole, nor ‘gringo’ (name 
given to the immigrants by the locals), nor black nor white, nor poor nor rich. One was 
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‘Uruguayan’.”   As soccer united the nation, it became a central component of 11
Uruguayan national identity; the “tournaments became gestures that overshadowed the 
nineteenth century battles: the captains resembled the caudillos of the Independence 
movement, the history of Uruguayan soccer began to be told from generation to 
generation, and its victories and losses sung about during Carnaval.”  The country that 12
had lacked historical figures and events around which to unite and identify, began to look 
to players and improbable victories to fill those voids.   
 The epic win in the 1950 World Cup against Brazil cemented the players’ place in 
the national imagination. In the country’s collective memory, the players’ victory was 
demonstrative of the national character of perseverance. It was taken to confirm one of 
the most prevalent myths on which Uruguayan nationalism was constructed: “the 
incommensurability between size and achievement; the disproportionality between the 
smallness of origin and the grandness of destiny.”  After the first Brazilian goal in the 13
1950 World Cup, the Uruguayan captain, Obdulio Varela, approached the English referee 
to complain about the offside goal. This action, which is said to have stalled the Brazilian 
momentum and allowed the Uruguayans to compose themselves, was seen as a 
personification of a “modern Uruguayan” that was valorous, determined, and capable of 
overcoming any situation.  Uruguayans saw Obdulio Varela as a mirror of Uruguayan 14
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society and his success as proof of what Uruguay could accomplish. Given the large role 
of these individuals in Uruguayan history,  
“it is paradoxical, that in all of the Montevideo city center, there is not one street, not one 
square that memorializes the champion’s names, triumphs, or grand achievements. There 
is one modest monument…a monument that Montevideans are not familiar with…on the 
outskirts of the Estadio Centenario, in the middle of the park, on a small plot of land 
called Maracaná Square.”  15
Varela and the rest of the players of the early twentieth century were not celebrity figures 
memorialized with grandiose monuments, but simple representatives of the Uruguayan 
society who proved the country’s identity as a small, but formidable nation.  
 The Decline of the National Team 
 After the mid-1950s, the national team faltered. In the 1954 World Cup, Uruguay 
lost to Hungary in the semifinals, a game that is to this day recognized as one of the 
greatest soccer matches in the sport’s history. The years following the Hungary loss saw 
the beginning of Uruguay’s decline.  Between 1954 and 2000, Uruguay qualified to only 16
six out of the eleven World Cups and won just five of its twenty-four games.  Rafael 17
Bayce, a Uruguayan sociologist, claims that the national team’s decline was “hastened by 
the twin processes of unrealistic public expectations and hostility towards its football.”  18
The country’s shared sense of nationhood was grounded in stories of glory and triumph, 
so Uruguayans refused to celebrate anything but victory. Uruguay’s fourth place finish in 
1970, its best result in twenty years, was a disappointment to Uruguayan fans who had 
expected a third World Cup title. Twenty years later, Gallup included a question in one of 
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their polls that asked individuals in which place they thought each of the sixteen 
participants of the 1990 World Cup would finish. From those poll results, Bayce 
calculated the “unreality coefficient”, a comparison between the place that each country 
ranked itself and the placement of that same country in the final, overall poll results. 
Every country saw itself performing better than other countries expected it to, thus all had 
an unrealistic coefficient larger than one. Uruguay had the single highest “unreality 
coefficient” of the entire poll at forty-nine.  Even after decades of failing to qualify for 19
the tournament or getting eliminated early on, Uruguayans had not adjusted their 
expectations. For Uruguayans, it was the soccer success experienced in the glory days 
that had become part of their national identity, and they were not ready to accept any less.  
 With the weight of the glorious past and the pressure to live up to the 
idiosyncratic Uruguayan style, players “resorted to a nervous, physical style of play” by 
the end of the 1950s.  Giulianotti describes Uruguay’s adoption of the violent tactics as a 20
change to “a safer, more aggressive and physical style that reflect(ed) the media and 
public thinking on football as war by proxy.”  National team players adopted violence in 21
the name of garra charrúa, the defining Uruguayan characteristic seen in Obdulio 
Varela’s courage and grit during the 1950 World Cup. Uruguay may not have had the best 
or fastest individual players, but it gave the most effort, had the most guts, and played 
with the most garra. The country’s “regressive nostalgia” for the glory days and teams of 
the past impeded “the exploration of new tactics and playing styles”, leaving the team to 
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perform with effort, aggression, and little else.  More so, the national team’s new “style” 22
earned the country a horrific reputation, one that was confirmed in the 1986 World Cup 
when Uruguay had a player sent off forty seconds into the game, the fastest red card 
awarded to this day.  The national team, once central to the Uruguayan identity due to 23
earning the country a positive external identity, developed a negative reputation.  
 The national clubs’ performances in two international competitions, the Copa 
Libertadores and Intercontinental Cup founded in 1959 and 1960, respectively, offered an 
opportunity to continue the narrative of Uruguay as a powerful soccer nation.  Peñarol 24
and Nacional, the two main Uruguayan clubs, made it to the finals of one of the two 
tournaments ten times between 1960 and 1971 and five times in the 1980s, winning the 
competitions fifty percent of the time they reached the finals.  The success of the clubs 25
allowed the ties between Uruguayan national identity and soccer to remain strong. Even 
though the national team was not performing well, the country was still producing 
internationally successful club teams; they were still a soccer nation. This would only 
change in the 1990s, when the global commercialization of soccer led to the decline of 
the Uruguayan clubs, as well: they lost stadium attendance, quality, players, and 
international prestige.  However, they did not lose their centrality in Uruguayans’ lives. 26
Fans could still associate with a national champion. 
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  The back and forth competition and success of the two main club teams sparked 
emotions and excitement in Uruguay and caused club loyalty to displace the unity once 
created by the national squad. Uruguayans still closely followed the national team and 
had high expectations, but fans mostly cheered and supported their own club’s players 
rather than the national squad as a whole. The antipathy between the opposing clubs’ 
fanbases was so large, that authorities had to physically separate the two crowds during 
some national team matches.  In 1986, Uruguay’s friendlies against Nacional and then 27
Peñarol were “… a sad display during which the Nacional fans cheered for Nacional and 
the Peñarol fans cheered for Peñarol…”  More than two decades later, the Peñarol 28
portion of the Uruguayan crowd whistled the substitution of Luis Suárez, a Nacional 
player, for Diego Forlán, who had once been a Peñarol man. Suárez expressed his 
frustration after the game, “I do not understand it, this is the Uruguayan jersey, we are all 
here for the same reason… the club jerseys should be left aside.”  Two months later, 29
when Nacional’s Sebastian Abreu and Peñarol’s Carlos Bueno were fighting for a starting 
spot on the national side. Bueno asked the public to “stop saying Abreu or Bueno, 
because one is identified with one part of the country and the other with another… we 
cannot lose sight that we need to support Uruguay.”  The national team no longer 30
overcame the country’s divides as it had during the glory days; it was seen as a collection 
of club players rather than a unified representation of the country. 
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 The fans did not have as much patience with the national team as they did with 
their club teams. In 2008, Coach Tabárez explained: 
“I have previously stated that the national team does not have fans and that you can see 
that when if within ten minutes we do not score, there is silence and then something else. 
A fan of a club has a greater tolerance for suffering. It is clear in the case of Peñarol, the 
fans supported even when things were not going so well, something that with the national 
team does not occur.”  31
Uruguay’s coach from 1999-2001, Daniel Passarella, had to request to stop playing in 
Montevideo due to the insulting whistling he would get from the crowds.  In 2004, 32
Alvaro Recoba, a player with a successful club career abroad who had been unable to hit 
his stride for the national team, was whistled off the field in Montevideo by forty 
thousand people due to a poor performance.  Jorge Fossati, the national team coach 33
expanded on this: “in recent times, it gets to the point that the player himself prefers to 
play away.”  Four years later, one journalist wrote, “It is very rare that Uruguay gets to 34
play at home. But the times that it does, it plays against its rival and against the 
people…”  Uruguayans’ frustrations with the national squad due to decades’ long losing 35
streaks caused even home games to be a hostile environment for the players.   
Locals and Repatriados: The Player-Fan Relationship 
 Due to commercialization and the player exodus to Europe, the national team 
began to be comprised of both local players and repatriados, players under contract with 
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clubs abroad. The repatriados played abroad because they were the best, which made 
fans question why their inclusion in the national team did not yield better results for the 
national team. The media and the public began to distrust the returning players and the 
term repatriados developed a negative connotation. Fans, unable to comprehend why 
players performed well abroad, but not at home, blamed the passion and dedication of 
individual players. This caused the relationship between the national team and the 
Uruguayan fans to flag. 
 The suspicion and distrust of the repatriados reached a climax in the 1990s, when 
Luis Cubilla, the national team coach between 1990 and 1993, openly criticized the 
italianos, the repatriados playing in the Italian league, when expressing his interest in 
taking over the national squad:  
“I cannot call a player that changes his mentality, that thinks that he wins $20,000 a 
month, that he has the best clothes, that he has the best car and comes to pretend like he is 
fair with his teammates. He hurts them when he says no, if they don’t pay $1,000, then 
we will not play with La Celeste because in soccer you earn a lot of money and you have 
to exploit it, and the player must earn money…”  36
His comments clearly show the negative perception and questioning of repatriados in 
Uruguay. As a response to his statement, the italianos announced that they would not 
defend the sky-blue shirt until the coach retracted his statement.   The media spun this as 37
further proof of the players’ arrogance and their abandonment of the Uruguayan fans and 
said things like “the players… said no to the people.”  The media’s criticism continued 38
even when the players accepted to return to the national team for the 1994 World Cup 
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qualifiers. Journalists avoided in-depth analysis and blamed the team’s failure to qualify 
for the World Cup on the italianos’ delayed arrival and lack of Uruguayan identity: 
“…the Brazilians, who when they succeed keep doing samba, keep wearing flip flops, 
and keep going to the bakery in Copacabana to drink beer with the guys from their 
neighborhood. Never would they park a sport car at the door, because they know that that 
is a clash with our way of life… those that let go of the national identity…they were 
italianos”  39
These events exposed the tension present between the Uruguayan public and players 
abroad as Uruguayans felt abandoned by the players and failed to identify with them. 
This marked the beginning of two decades of tension between fans and players. 
 As European soccer became richer, the exodus of Uruguayan players accelerated. 
Between 1997 and 2001, 502 Uruguayan players left the country, the equivalent of more 
than forty-five starting line ups.  On August 2, 2007, Jorge Señorans, a Uruguayan 40
journalist, addressed the exodus: 
“Many times, it is proposed that perhaps it would be best to create a base for the national 
team with local players and just reinforce it with the ones from abroad. But the issue is 
that there is not a professional group of local players, because if they perform well and 
have a good enough level to be on the national team then they sleep with their suitcases 
packed.”  41
Señorans highlighted the thirteen national team players that had emigrated in the previous 
year and emphasized how the exodus changed the composition of the national team. By 
the end of the qualifiers for the 2010 World Cup, the Uruguayan team fielded only 
players that had contracts with clubs abroad.  The increase in the number of players 42
from abroad meant that the distrust that had existed between the fans and the italianos 
during the repatriados crisis of the 1990s now affected a large part of the national side. 
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Fans wanted players to perform as they did with their clubs abroad, but did not want the 
players to become dependent on the comforts that had become part of modern sports. 
Giulianotti explains that “supporters criticized their (repatriados) efforts as corrupted by 
the lazy, rich, unpatriotic, lifestyle that (was) allegedly enjoyed in foreign climates.”  In 43
1994, Julio Toyos, a Uruguayan journalist, had expressed that very concern — that 
players were becoming too dependent on the work conditions that they had abroad: 
“And today, we must admit it, unfortunately, that they are good players, but they are 
missing that something needed to carry the team on their back… that which Gambeta 
had, that Obdulio had… the old Uruguayan soccer lineage. These guys have changed 
their habits because they changed their environment. It is different when one changes in 
the dressing rooms in Central and Sudamerica than when one begins to frequent the frilly 
dressing rooms with air conditioning and hair dryers…”  44
Unfortunately for the players, global commercialization had made fans perceive players 
more as part of the “them” of the outside world rather than as representatives of the 
Uruguayan “us”. 
 The Uruguayan Football Association, the national governing body of soccer, was 
able to hide its own flaws by joining the fans in the criticism of the players. The national 
association’s lack of reliable revenue streams due to a small domestic audience and a 
declining club league inhibited it from providing good training and traveling conditions 
to the players. While many of the national team’s failures could have been due to the 
Uruguayan national team’s lack of modern facilities, the Uruguayan Football Association 
passed the blame on to the players.  In 2002, the executives announced that they wanted 
to find players with a different kind of mentality for the national team, because they were 
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displeased with the existing poor attitudes of the players on and off the field.  The media 45
fanned the flames further. Journalists shared stories and poor experiences with the players 
whom they said had never had the “decency to say good afternoon” and reported that 
fans’ overwhelmingly agreed about the lack of humility, respect, professionalism, 
modesty, and dignity found in their ‘superstar’ national players.  They published quotes 46
about the Uruguayans’ frustrations over players’ lack of national characteristics, such as 
the following: “to wear la celeste (sky-blue shirt) you must first be celeste” and “even if 
the players are all coming from abroad, when one returns to this country, one drinks mate 
(the traditional Uruguayan tea).”  Both statements suggested that in order to play on the 47
national team, players needed to both play and behave the Uruguayan way. The media’s 
negative narrative towards the players was still present in 2004 when journalists in 
Uruguay referred to the players returning from abroad with phrases like “big names that 
blind us”, “lacking good attitude”, “prefer to lose without the famous ones”, and “in need 
of more dignity”.   Players did not take the attacks well and often expressed their 48
frustrations with the media, hoping that they would stop accusing them of not giving their 
all.  49
 During the early glory days, the team had been made up of working men, normal 
Uruguayans. While at the end of the century, the local clubs still consisted of this type of 
players, at least before they left to go abroad, the repatriados were seen as spoiled 
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celebrities with bad attitudes.  Giulianotti describes the shift using the example of Enzo 50
Francescoli who “reflect(ed) the bourgeoisification within South American football. His 
nomadic pursuit of wealth and success (was) the antithesis of Varela’s satisfaction with 
more frugal civic rewards for more definitive and glorious deeds.”  The repatriados’ 51
alleged greed was contrasted with the ‘hunger’ experienced by the figures of the past and 
those still struggling with the poor salaries of Uruguayan clubs.  The lyrics of Orsei, a 52
song written by the Uruguayan band Rumbo, exposes the tension that grew between fans 
and players by telling “the story of a garbage worker who stops himself acclaiming a goal 
by his football hero after reflecting on the huge salary differences between them.”  53
Commercialization turned the Uruguayan national players from everyday heroes to 
wealthy celebrities, impeding Uruguayans from being able to identify with them and 
challenging the historic connection between the national team and Uruguayans. 
 Uruguayans saw themselves as a soccer nation, because the sport was both the 
cultural symbol that united the country internally and the one that provided them with an 
identity abroad. The 1950 World Cup victory was the last major success of the 
Uruguayan national soccer team, but the decline of the team’s caliber did not eradicate 
the role of soccer in the national identity. As the national team lost international 
prominence, national clubs filled the void. This allowed Uruguay to retain its identity as a 
soccer country, but rather than uniting the country as the national team had, the clubs 
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created opposing sub-communities within it. The national team no longer contributed 
images and stories to foster the Uruguayan people’s shared sense of nationhood; instead, 
club experiences served to divide the country. The club based division persisted even as 
commercialization in the 1990s brought about the clubs’ economic decline and resulting 
lack of competitiveness, because, unlike with the national team, fans were able to keep 
identifying with the local club teams’ players.  Whereas fans had once been able to 
identify with the simplicity and humbleness of all national team players, see themselves 
reflected in their heroes, and feel represented by the team, global commercialization’s 
effects led fans to only be able to identify with those that were in the local leagues.  
 40
Chapter Three: El Maestro Tabárez’s Long Term Project 
 Since the 1990s, the game of soccer has undergone major changes in terms of its 
tactical orientation and infrastructural modernization. However, the Uruguayan national 
team has struggled to keep up with these fundamental shifts. In its attempt to return the 
national squad to old glory, the Uruguayan Football Association hired and fired twelve 
coaches between 1990 and 2006, never allowing any of them to complete an entire World 
Cup Qualifying cycle.  When Óscar Wáshington Tabárez became coach in 2006, he 1
implemented a long-term plan to return Uruguay to a competitive level and adapt to the 
changes of commercialization. Rather than trying to revive the glory days, Tabárez aimed 
to reclaim Uruguay’s relevance in the globalized game by fixing the structural and 
institutional flaws of the national game and giving it a new domestic and international 
image.  
The Troubles of Uruguayan Soccer 
  One indication of Uruguay’s institutional failures was the team’s struggle to find 
opponents for friendly matches.  The national association could not pay other teams to 2
travel to Montevideo and did not have the FIFA rankings or results in international 
“Los celestes cambian de DT como de camiseta,” El Observador, April 07, 2004. 1
 “Uruguay se queda sin rival para jugar el 18 de agosto”, El Observador, August 05, 2004.2
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tournaments to be invited for friendlies elsewhere. Rather than test its squad against good 
opponents, Uruguay often ended up playing against amateur Uruguayan squads, which in 
turn led to even lower FIFA rankings.   During the 2006 World Cup Qualifiers, the team 3
went an entire year without playing any friendlies.  This made it difficult to develop 4
teamwork and game strategies with players under contract abroad. Moreover, European 
clubs regularly refused to release their players or did so late for official national team 
games, causing Uruguayan coaches to have to reshuffle the team and have only one or 
two practices to train with the entire squad.  A lack of cohesiveness on the field was the 5
result. It also affected the camaraderie of the team off the field; fights between coaches 
and players were not uncommon. Both on and off the field, the team acted as a group of 
individuals rather than a unit, fueling the portrayal of players as arrogant, selfish stars 
playing for themselves rather than the country or each other.  
 For players used to the organizational standards of European clubs, the 
Uruguayan national team could not offer adequate conditions. To improve its standing, 
the team depended on these star players, but it did not offer them the facilities and 
support they needed to be successful.  The players complained, for example, that the 
team’s training complex had never fully been completed when it was constructed and that 
they had to sleep on old mattresses.  The conditions for away matches were not better; 6
the Uruguayan Football Association often bought economy class flights for players, 
 “La práctica de la fecha FIFA”, El Observador, August 19, 2004.3
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meaning that prior to playing a professional soccer match players had to spend an 
uncomfortable overnight flight with their “knees up by their chest”.  These poor 7
accommodations likely contributed to the disparity between players’ performances for 
their clubs vs. for their country. 
Óscar Wáshington Tabárez’s Diagnosis  
 After Uruguay failed to qualify for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, the 
Uruguayan Football Association contacted Óscar Wáshington Tabárez to conduct a study 
on the state of soccer in Uruguay. Tabárez, sometimes referred to as El Maestro, had had 
a long coaching career in Uruguay, but he had also coached abroad which gave him the 
outside perspective to analyze the flaws of the national game and understand the forces of 
the transnational labor market. He had begun his coaching career with the youth divisions 
of a small Uruguayan club, Bella Vista, while working at an elementary school in order to 
make ends meet. With limited time, resources, and available players, Tabárez led 
Uruguay to its first Pan-American Games’ gold medal in 1983. Four years later, he led 
Peñarol to the Copa Libertadores title which put him in the spotlight and earned him the 
appointment as the Uruguayan national team coach for the 1990 World Cup.  Fired after a 8
Round of 16 elimination at the World Cup, Tabárez coached club soccer first in Boca 
Juniors in Argentina and then first division clubs in Italy and Spain, where he had a 
chance to observe the advances of the global game. 
 “Hora de los rebeldes,” El Observador, November 13, 2005.7
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 Tabárez has been a close observer of Uruguayan soccer for a long time, and he 
knew how it compared to the game in leading nations abroad. Already after his first stint 
as Uruguayan coach in 1990, Tabárez had presented an analysis at a seminar on the 
disparity between Uruguayan and global soccer.  In 2004, at a time of “constant sporting 9
and organizational crisis…”, Tabárez identified the issues plaguing the national sport and 
called for a leader to look past the immediate results, prioritize, and set realistic goals.  A 10
year later, he gave a formal presentation at Uruguay’s Museum of Soccer in Montevideo 
on the topic.  In his speech, he stated that the movement of players to Europe was 
interrupting players’ development and that changes needed to be made so that players 
would be more prepared prior to leaving. He emphasized that to truly prepare players, 
training needed to include human and professional aspects and not only technical ones 
from an early age.  Tabárez wanted to emulate the work that José Pékerman had done 11
with Argentina’s youth divisions to provide continuity, cohesion, and identity to the 
national team process.  Tabárez also called for changes from the Uruguayan Football 12
Association, explaining that to keep up with elite football, Uruguay needed to improve 
velocity and therefore needed better-maintained fields for players to train on and more 
modern training facilities.  Uruguay, he argued, needed to rethink its approach to the 13
game, reign in unrealistic expectations before matches, and cut back on excessive 
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criticism after games. Tabárez concluded his presentation by explaining that if Uruguay 
followed his advice and modernized its training methods, the national team would once 
again see positive results.  14
 Tabárez was nominated for the national team coach position in 2002 and 2004 by 
Daniel Pastorini, a member of the Executive Board of the Uruguayan Football 
Association, but failed to garner enough votes.  In 2005, the Executive Board of the 15
Uruguayan Football Association finally offered him the position because it recognized the 
potential of his long-term plan for the national team.  Figueredo announced that 16
Uruguay would “need to begin to reformulate everything: the youth divisions, local 
players, the experience with the players abroad. There (would) need to be a study and a 
complete five-year plan.”  Pastorini explained that “the most important thing is that the 17
project is for all of the national teams, starting from the very bottom with the youth 
teams, from the base, and reaching the national side. It is important to begin a long-term 
project.”  Tabárez returned to the position as national team coach because the 18
Association accepted a different project; he would have declined to be hired under the 
same conditions as in 1990.   19
 Ibid., 280.14
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Playing the Long Game: El Maestro’s Project 
 At his first press conference as coach, Tabárez distributed a folder to the media 
with the label, “The Institutionalization of the Processes of the National Teams and the 
Formation of their Players.”  It was his proposal to modernize Uruguayan soccer and 20
respond to the effects of global commercialization. It offered a diagnosis of the state of 
Uruguayan soccer, clear, concise goals for the project, and player development objectives 
based on José Pekerman’s work with Argentina’s youth divisions and Barcelona’s recipe 
for success in Europe. Tabárez attributed the poor state of the national sport to the exodus 
of players, often at a very young age, and the discontinuity of organization and strategic 
coordination of the national team.  He proposed to establish continuity and stability in 21
Uruguayan soccer by instituting standardized policies and practice routines for all levels 
of the national team, organizing all practices and games in advance to fit both national 
and international calendars, and guaranteeing friendlies and competition for the national 
side. Tabárez became the first Uruguayan coach to utilize computer software to analyze 
opponents and past games, have the main team’s coaches also oversee the youth 
divisions, and employ a psychologist to attend to the players.  Although these practices 22
were common in successful European clubs and national teams, they faced heavy 
criticism from conservative Uruguayan journalists until Tabárez backed them up with 
results. 
 Ivan Castagnello, “Orgulloso de usted, ‘Maestro’,” La Red 21, June 28, 2014.20
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 Tabárez’s proposal outlined a tactical orientation, practice outlines, and numerous 
other technical improvements, but it also concentrated on the pursuit of structural 
changes in the Uruguayan Football Association, primarily in the way the youth divisions 
were run. He had observed Pekerman’s work with the Argentina youth and wanted to 
apply the approach in Uruguay.  Tabárez sought to “coordinate the objectives and 
activities of the national teams at all age groups to reach long and mid range 
objectives.”  Thus, Tabárez and his staff would oversee the work of the junior squads to 23
guarantee continuity.  The proposal also stated that the coaching staff would “pay 24
attention to the intellectual development and the players’ connections with the cultural 
universe (through their curriculum and other activities that positively influence their 
personal, and eventually, professional, development).”  Youth players would be 25
encouraged to continue their education and efforts were put into place to assist players’ 
who lacked it.   For him, the youth needed to be able to learn more from soccer than 26
technical skills; he sought to teach them about social networking, communication, and 
teamwork, as well.  27
 Tabárez maintained that the Uruguayan coaches needed to find a way to instill a 
passion for the national team in the youth players before they left the country. He 
maintained that “no team, no matter how deep its wallet, can have the luxury to be 
missing organized youth divisions that identify with where they are, with the 
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institution.”   Thus, Tabárez designated time for his young players to learn and discuss 28
the history of country’s team, the importance of the national soccer culture, and the 
privilege that it was to play on the team.  He added that “reading, learning about 29
Maracaná, about the generation from the Olympics, is part of the player’s formation or 
training…they need to feel a part of a historical continuum…of an identity that makes us 
known abroad.”  He sought to ensure that even after moving abroad, players identified 30
with the team, its history, its culture, and in turn, with the country. His reforms would 
ensure that players understand the privilege of playing on the national team, willingly 
return to play for the country in spite of the inferior conditions, and give it their all “for 
the sky-blue jersey”. Tabárez aimed to embed Uruguayan traditions into the players, so 
that even if they left Uruguay at a young age they would have an attachment to the 
national team and the country; he prepared the players to be transmigrants.  
 To tackle the issue of excessive stardom and individualism that had hampered 
team cohesion, Tabárez defined an ideal profile for players on the national team. Diego 
Aguirre, a seasoned Uruguayan club soccer coach, described Tabárez’s emphasis on the 
character of players: “for him it is more of the human aspect, the profile of player that 
one needs to find…he maintains that the most important thing is the wood…that 
afterwards one can carve it.”  The players would need to demonstrate solidarity, effort, 31
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respect, and sacrifice and accept their respective roles on the team.  To him, part of 32
solidarity and respect was having low profiles and being humble, and allowing “the only 
star (to be) the team”.  It was also about the right image to project to the rest of the 33
world. Tabárez aimed to counter the Uruguayan reputation of aggression and dirty play 
by encouraging a different kind of garra from his players: they were to play cleanly and 
strive for the Fair Play trophy.  Concentrating on low profile players willing to play 34
within the rules of the game was Tabárez’s approach to saving Uruguayan soccer.  
On the Field Results under El Maestro’s Project 
  In an interview in March 2016, the 2010 team captain, Diego Lugano, was asked 
what had allowed for Uruguay’s return to success on the global stage. He replied:  
“When the world credits our generation for this comeback, I am always very analytical. I 
always point to the project, one that for the first time in Uruguayan history, was 
concentrated on more than the result…We lost, we played poorly, and we still received 
support… We had a historical privilege. We were not even close to being the best 
generation of Uruguayan soccer players; we were just lucky to have the support of a type 
of project that is now fundamental in modern soccer.”  35
When the FIFA soccer ranking began in 1993, the Uruguayan team’s annual ranking was 
seventeenth place. After a sharp decline in the late 1990s, Uruguay returned to around the 
same level at which it had begun and stayed there until 2010. Since then, Uruguay has 
managed to stay in or near the top ten. The graph below shows the team’s recent return to 
the global stage, but also why the long-term process was crucial. The commitment to a 
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long-term program yielded results:  the Uruguayan national team is is again 
internationally competitive. 
 Uruguay left South Africa in July 2010 with its best World Cup performance since 
1970: fourth place. Diego Forlán became the first Uruguayan since 1970 to be placed on 
the World Cup All-Star team and the first one in history to be selected as the best player 
of the tournament.  The tournament legitimized the Tabárez process with the successful 36
introduction of several youth division players that had played in the 2007 U-20 World 
Cup, such as Luis Suárez, Edinson Cavani, and Martín Cáceres, and one from the 2009 
U-20 World Cup, Nicolas Lodeiro.  The seamless transition from the youth divisions and 37
the main squad worked.  
 The success continued after the 2010 World Cup. The following year, Uruguay 
won its fifteenth Copa América, becoming the country with the most Copa América 
championships in history. The first place finish, like the fourth place in the World Cup, 
 Ian Chadband, “World Cup 2010: Uruguay striker Diego Forlán makes big splash to win Golden Ball award,” The 36
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provided financial relief for the Uruguayan Football Association through prize money; it 
also assured improved friendly schedules for the following years.  At the Copa América, 38
Uruguay won the Fair Play Award for the most sportsmanlike and clean team in the 
tournament. National team player Sebastian Abreu joked after the tournament that giving 
the Fair Play Award to Diego Lugano, the team captain always seen as an aggressive 
defender, was like giving the Nobel Peace Prize to bin Laden.  Luis Suárez was awarded 39
Best Player of the Tournament, while Sebastián Coates was given the award of Best 
Young Player of the Tournament.  Both Suárez and Coates had come out of U-20 40
squads, illustrating how the long-term project led directly to player development and 
success.  
 By mid-2012, Uruguay was second behind only Spain in the FIFA Ranking, its 
highest placement since the ranking system began in 1992, and it participated in the 
Olympic soccer tournament for the first time since its 1928 Gold Medal.   In 2013, 41
Uruguay qualified for its third U-17 World Cup, while the U-20 squad became the first in 
the world to qualify to four consecutive U-20 World Cups.  At the 2013 U-20 World 42
Cup, many of the players that had contributed to the second place finish in the 2011 U-17 
World Cup in Mexico led Uruguay to the second place spot behind France.  The young 43
Uruguayan players cultivated teamwork on the field and camaraderie off it before even 
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joining the main national squad. Just two months after the U-20 second place finish, one 
of the starting defenders, José María Giménez, debuted with the national team at a “win 
or be eliminated” World Cup Qualifier. After falling out of the top four, the only direct 
qualifying slots in the South American Qualifiers, Uruguay had had its back against the 
wall. In order to keep its World Cup dreams alive, it had to beat Colombia. Giménez 
helped shut out Colombia in a 2-0 win and allowed Uruguay to continue its path to the 
2014 World Cup.  In November 2013, Uruguay qualified, yet again, through an 44
intercontinental playoff due to finishing fifth in the South American Qualifiers; this 
marked the first time since 1990 that Uruguay attended two World Cup tournaments back 
to back. After captain Diego Lugano suffered a knee injury during the first game of the 
2014 World Cup, Giménez, one of Tabárez’s youth players, ably replaced him in the 
victories against England and Italy, Uruguay’s first wins against European opponents 
since 1966.  Under Tabárez, Uruguay has experienced its most successful period since 45
the early twentieth century. The success owes much to strong teamwork and a tactical 
orientation that is taught all the way down the youth levels; young players are able to 
quickly fill the voids left behind by aging players.   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Chapter 4: The Reinvention of La Celeste’s Image  
  Óscar Washington Tabárez recognized that the negative attitude towards players 
was a result of soccer’s global commercialization, but also of the glorification of the past 
and the comparison between “those authentic champions and the ones from now”.  The 1
contemporary players’ affluence and celebrity status marked a stark difference from the 
profiles of past players and the traditional Uruguayan self-perception. The players of the 
glory era, such as José Nasazzi in 1930 and Obdulio Varela in 1950, contributed to the 
formation of the identity of the “us”, the Uruguayan identity that is characterized by its 
simple, humble, and down-to-earth nature. On the other hand, Uruguayans questioned 
contemporary players who had moved abroad for their lack of Uruguayan characteristics; 
they were not always seen as part of the “us”. Tabárez claimed that the best strategy to 
address the veneration for past glories was to “combat…with effort, a certain image, and 
results” and to “connect the past and present to build the future of the national team.”  2
Tabárez’s plan looked to develop a player-team relationship like that of the past, but 
within the limitations and context of the new globalized game. 
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The New Profile: Discipline, Humility, and Solidarity 
 Tabárez, inspired by the image of Barcelona players, “their professionalism, good 
manners, respect for their rivals and the public”,  put an emphasis on highlighting the 3
human qualities.  He sought to take advantage of the national team’s platform to 
promulgate positive value systems, such as “setting challenges, overcoming them, having 
goodwill… and respect, the solidarity that comes with everything that is done with a 
group, and the feeling of belonging.”   Tabárez insisted that “when one is a child, young, 4
one has the necessity to have idols, role models, and if we work towards having certain 
types of role models, that relay certain values, show certain things, we will have good 
teams.”  The national team was to represent the country well internationally and the 5
players to act as role models for Uruguayans.  Tabárez asked for a polished appearance, 
so as to emulate the professionalism displayed in European club and national soccer.  
Players were to wear suits and ties during travel in order to make the team look put 
together and professional and emphasized the players’ appearances in press conferences.  6
 One of the main areas that Tabarez focused on was the players’ communication 
skills. For years, journalists had portrayed players as rude and arrogant, and videos of 
inarticulate press conferences had made them look uneducated. Tabárez recognized that 
communication and speaking were among the professional players’ new responsibilities 
in a media-driven soccer business and noted that “everyone laughs at the soccer players, 
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but no one helps them.”  Looking to prepare players while they were still in the youth 7
divisions, he implemented role-playing exercises during which individuals took turns 
answering questions while the rest of the team gave feedback on their deliveries.  His 8
efforts were recognized after the 2010 World Cup when the Uruguayan Academy of 
Language, a public institution that strives to preserve, enrich, and promote the 
development of the national language and culture in Uruguay, wrote Tabárez a letter 
congratulating him for the players’ simple, respectful, and appropriate way of speaking.  9
 Tabárez also encouraged the national players to be humble and amicable towards 
fans. “No one is better than anyone else” is a famous Uruguayan expression that 
“Uruguayans have inscribed in their DNA…”  Humility is a central pillar of Uruguayan 10
identity and thus, the Uruguayan public found it difficult to see famous, high-profile 
players as mirrors of the Uruguayan society. Tabárez encouraged humility which made 
players seem approachable, but also more Uruguayan; this encouraged the narrative that 
players were able to retain their national identity even when spending the majority of 
their time abroad. El Mundo, a Spanish newspaper, praised the Uruguayan players in a 
2011 article that labeled Uruguay as the “team of the people”: they are “always with a 
smile. Always signing autographs for fans when they leave the hotel. No one is denied. 
With order and professionalism, Uruguay is the model for the rest of the teams to 
imitate.”  Team captain Lugano showed leadership in this area and set a goal for himself 11
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to never deny his autograph or picture.  The fans were granted access to the players 12
while they were in Uruguay or at tournaments, which helped to counteract the remoteness 
between fans and players that was caused by the global commercialization of the sport. 
The team’s openness kept the players grounded, while showing appreciation, kindness, 
and humility to the fans. 
 The players’ involvement with Uruguayan society did not end with autographs 
and selfies. Tabárez’s 2010 World Cup team founded Fundación Celeste, a nonprofit 
conceived by the players at the World Cup and founded with a portion of their World Cup 
winnings. In addition, many players had individual projects to give back to society, such 
as benefit games, traditional parties in their hometowns, and visits to hospitals.  The 13
players also used their high profiles to call attention to serious issues. For example, 
following a deadly tornado in Uruguay on April 15, 2016, the national team players sent 
videos of encouragement and shared information on their social media page about 
donation drives for those affected.   Tabárez encouraged this openness of the squad to 14
the public, but the philanthropic actions, such as the nonprofit and the players’ individual 
endeavors, were player-driven initiatives. The players wanted to use their privileged 
position to have a long-term impact on their society.  The players’ work for their local 15
communities helped change the narrative that had haunted the repatriados of the national 
team for decades; it helped debunk the notion that moving abroad had severed their 
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connection and passion for Uruguay. They showed that they had interests and relations 
that spanned borders. They were transmigrants. 
 The “no one is better than anyone else” mentality and the emphasis on solidarity 
translated into improvements of the team’s chemistry. Before Tabárez, individual star 
players from different clubs had struggled to create a cohesive team.   Tabárez managed 16
to create a group unlike previous Uruguayan teams, one in which each player accepted 
his role and problems with stars and divas did not exist.  The squad’s solidarity became 17
just as much of identity marker for the Uruguayan national team as garra charrúa had 
been for decades.  Luis Suárez, later to become Uruguay’s all-time top scorer, praised 18
the dynamics of the national team before he was a regular starter: “…no one thinks they 
are better than anyone else… no, we are all the same and that makes the group feel good, 
happy. The fact that all 23 players that are on the team know that they have the chance to 
play. It unites the group.”  In 2011, Sebastián Eguren, a midfielder on the 2010 Uruguay 19
team, stated, “I have never seen a group like this one, there is magic. The ‘us’ prevails 
over the ‘I’”,  a sentiment similar to the one shared by Diego Lugano in 2010 when he 20
credited the result achieved in South Africa to the unity and friendship that Tabárez had 
encouraged.  The team’s unity and the players’ humble attitude earned the respect and 21
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admiration of Uruguayans who saw the players as mirrors of society — and it prevented 
conflicts within the team.  
The Role of Technology During the Tabárez Era       
 The later years of the Tabárez era coincided with an increase in access to cable 
television and the internet in Uruguay. In 2011, 52.4% of Uruguayans had cable or 
satellite television subscription, while 33.5% of households had internet access. Those 
numbers increased to 68% and 57.4%, respectively, by 2014.  As cable and internet 22
access increased in Uruguay, European clubs began to gain more regular followers from 
Uruguayan soccer fans. As affinity to national team players grew and access to the 
international leagues increased, following the performances of Uruguayan players abroad 
became a shared experience for Uruguayans; the game scores and player performances 
became part of everyday conversations. It was the teams with successful Uruguayan 
players, such as Liverpool, Barcelona, and Paris St. Germain, that gained the most fans. 
For example, the French league only began to gain traction in Uruguay when Edinson 
Cavani and Diego Rolan began playing there in 2013.  The increased access to foreign 23
games was accompanied by increased media coverage. In 2013, the national newspapers 
began to publish a weekly list of all of the Uruguayan players abroad, the date and time 
of their games that week, and the channel on which they could be seen.  Additionally, 24
local news channels began to show video compilations every day of Uruguayan goals 
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around the world for those that could not watch the games. The increased access to 
technology allowed Uruguayans to stay up to date with the games of Uruguayan players 
abroad, watch their highlights, and feel involved in their successes and failures.  
 Television also allowed the team’s new image to be promulgated by an array of 
marketing campaigns. The national team players endorsed a wide range of products, 
everything from laundry detergent to snacks had a celeste special edition.  By being 25
spokespeople for everyday Uruguayan products, the players encouraged the narrative that 
they maintained a Uruguayan lifestyle. While the Uruguayan players benefitted from 
aligning themselves with national brands and products, marketing firms profited from 
using the national team as a vehicle to connect their products with the people.  These 26
marketing firms tied their products to the players that were beloved by the public, but at 
the same time legitimized the fact that the team’s lessons and values were just as 
important as their results. Marketing campaigns incorporated themes like respect, family, 
and self discipline into their commercials. Antel, a telecommunication company, made a 
commercial with Diego Forlán in which he talked about giving it your all, pushing 
yourself, and studying.  UTE, an electricity company, had an ad with captain Diego 27
Lugano in which he stated that “together we can do more” and that “sometimes you lose, 
sometimes you win, but what is important is knowing you tried your best.”  The 28
marketing firms facilitated the dissemination of Tabárez’s’ new value-centered player 
profiles and encouraged fans to place value in the effort and not the results. 
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 The Uruguayan Football Association’s own marketing firm, Punto Ogilvy, 
actively promoted the importance of the team’s non-soccer successes.  The firm explained 
the special appeal of Tabárez’s group:  “more than in sporting results, we Uruguayans see 
the values of our society in this group of  professional athletes, the ones that keep 
showing us that through those values one gets results. Even more importantly, they 
reaffirm our way of being, our culture, and our identity.”  In 2014, Punto Ogilvy created 29
a marketing campaign for the Uruguayan Football Association that focused on these non-
soccer aspects. The campaign was named “Valores Celestes (Sky-Blue Values) —Made in 
Uruguay”. The promo spot showed a montage of game clips while a dramatic narrator 
said:   
“The result always matters, but it is not everything. El Maestro already said it: The 
journey is the reward. We can do spectacularly well, we can do fine, or we can even do 
poorly, but for us Uruguayans the only possible result is to put our hearts into each thing 
that we do. To complete each play with respect, teamwork, confidence, discipline, 
courage, talent, and love. That is Uruguay. Those are our values. Let’s go La Celeste. You 
can see who we are… on the field.”    30
Punto Ogilvy and the Uruguayan Football Association took Tabárez’s focus on the 
journey and used it to promote an identification with the team that depended on values 
rather than results. This helped construct the narrative that what made the players 
Uruguayan symbols was not triumphs or glory, but their Uruguayan values. 
 Social Media and the internet allowed the public to get to know its national team 
players on a more personal, human level within the context of the new globalized world. 
The intimacy of the relationship between players and fans that formed in the early 
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twentieth century -- when they lived next to each other, saw each other on the street, and 
shared a lifestyle -- was impossible in the new era of international transfer markets. 
Social media and the internet, however, allowed for a new type of connection to exist, 
similar to that between Uruguayans and family members outside of the country. The 
technology could not offer the same immediate contact as living next to each other, but 
they did permit shared experiences to continue long distance. By seeing the day to day 
lives of the players, fans were able to feel connected. In 2010, Diego Forlán published 
pictures and public updates, “because he once had been a fan and (knew) that having the 
possibility to know what a player lived day by day (was) nice.”  The internet and social 31
media both served to close the emotional gap between players and fans by allowing 
Uruguayans stuck on the other side of the ocean to have a first hand account of events.  
  Television programs, such as Cámara Celeste and Pasión Mundial, began to 
follow the teams to tournaments to show a more in-depth account of the players’ lives. 
The shows highlighted arbitrary, non-soccer every-day moments throughout the players’ 
experience, which helped the narrative of the players’ normalcy. For example, during the 
2010 World Cup, Cámara Celeste, a show filmed with a shaky handheld camera, showed 
interviews with the players in the airport duty-free shop buying perfume and signing 
autographs, the hotel pool drinking mate, and on the plane listening to music or 
sleeping.  The show, which was more like a home video, made the players appear like 32
normal Uruguayans, not distant celebrities. Sebastian Abreu, a forward on the national 
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side, pursued a similar project when he recorded the team’s experience at major 
tournaments to later share with the public; he wanted to allow the fans to see the 
tournament from their point of view.  In 2015, the show Por la Camiseta used informal 33
interviews to show the day to day lives of nine Uruguayan players in Europe and to “get 
to know the person more and the player less.”  The show did display the elite lifestyle of 34
the players, but it mostly concentrated on how each of the players maintained Uruguayan 
traditions, whether it be food or music, in their everyday lives, and how each of them, 
even though they were superstars, gave everything “for the (Uruguayan) jersey”.  These 35
television shows put on display the lives of the national team players, highlighting 
characteristics and values that demonstrated that the players were transmigrants, 
representatives of the “us” even while living among the “them”. 
A New Connection Between Players and Fans  
 In his first official meeting with the players in May 2006, Tabárez asked them for 
adhesión. He asked them to take part in his project and ignore the hostile atmosphere in 
Uruguay that had sparked controversies and early player retirements from the national 
side in the past. During that first encounter, well aware that the public was at odds with 
the national team, Tabárez appealed to the players and asked that they have faith in his 
project. He said, “You guys know what they may say in Uruguay about you. That you 
don’t try as hard on the national team as you do at your clubs, that you won’t give it your 
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all, even that they think you come to steal money. You guys already know all of this. So I 
ask that you never allow that to be a justification to stop doing things.”   He asked his 36
players to buy into the project even in bad times, because he knew that the public would 
not grant its support until it saw positive results. When referring to the fate of the project, 
Tabárez pointed to “a film by Woody Allen, Match Point, that starts with a tennis ball 
running along the net, while a voiceover says that the story he is going to tell will be one 
if it falls to one side and another if it falls to the other.”  Tabárez’s appeal to the team was 37
parallel to the opening scene; he claimed the success and the public opinion of the project 
depended entirely on the results.  
 To Tabárez’s and the players’ surprise, however, the public valued and applauded 
the changes made off the field even before the team produced positive results at the 2010 
World Cup. On the eve of their departure to South Africa, over 2,000 fans went to the 
Montevideo Airport to watch the team depart, a crowd that shocked the players and 
executives. Edgard Welker, the Vice President of Peñarol at the time, reacted to the crowd 
at the airport, “(the players) have a lot of ‘feeling’ with the people. Honestly, it is 
unbelievable. When I got here, I could not believe it… all the people that are here.”  The 38
Vice-President of the Uruguayan Football Association, Miguel Sejas offered his 
explanation, “one sees the fervor of the Uruguayan public, the hope. I think that more 
than the achievements on the field, it is the attitude of the team that has caused this 
current relationship.” Diego Lugano, the captain of the Uruguayan squad, explained the 
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crowd’s size by highlighting that “the Uruguayan people identify with the group and the 
group identifies itself with the people.”  The crowd’s size demonstrated that the 39
improvement in the team-fan relationship did not occur merely as a result of the 2010 
tournament; the public supported the Tabárez process and the players even before the 
team achieved positive results. 
 The fan support was particularly surprising in light of the negative media 
portrayal.  A compilation of videos collected by Channel 10 in Uruguay, called “Tabárez 
vs. Journalism”, highlights the continual barrage of criticism that the coach and players 
received prior to 2010. Julio Ríos, a Uruguayan sports commentator and journalist 
complained in July 2007, “Tabárez manages the players as if this was European soccer. 
Which is not the way to work with the player from the River Plate or a Uruguayan.” Two 
years later, he was still at it:  “this is a European team. I ask myself if Uruguayan soccer is 
like that or if it is more of an undisciplined style.”  Uruguayan soccer identity had been 
tied to a violent interpretation of garra charrúa for decades, leading journalists to 
criticize the overemphasis on respect, solidarity, and values as a move away from the 
Uruguayan way. Alberto Sonsol complained in August 2008 that “they say ‘the group is 
great’, ‘they’re all respectful’, ‘that they all get along’… but I want them to win. What do I 
care if they get along or not?” In June 2009, he pushed that winning was all Uruguay 
should aspire to: “Uruguay is a slave of its rich history…History obligates us.”  Tabárez’s 40
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emphasis on the human aspects of the players was seen as too much of a shift away from 
the traditional association of soccer with national glory.  
 The identification between the fans and players grew stronger throughout the 
2010 World Cup. When Uruguay won its second group stage game against the hosts in 
June, many young Uruguayans took to the streets to celebrate. When asked by journalists 
if the celebrations were too premature, the people responded that they were not.  This 41
showed the mentality change that the country was undergoing. Luis Ubiña, the captain of 
the 1970 Uruguayan team, compared the happiness experienced in Uruguay during the 
2010 World Cup to that from 1950, stating that even back then people had not been as 
joyful as they were during the South African tournament.  For Uruguayans, all teams 42
had always been compared to the 1950 squad, which is why in 1970, fourth place had 
been seen as a failure. In 2010, however, that mindset changed and fourth place was 
accepted and celebrated as a big accomplishment. A song written as a fundraiser for 
Fundación Celeste after the tournament has the lyrics “today like yesterday, in 1950.” It 
equates the fourth place finish of the 2010 World Cup to the glory days of the past.   In 43
2010, a fourth place finish was seen as a victory and the players as heroes.  Journalists 44
joined the choir once the World Cup results were in. Julio Ríos complimented Tabárez for 
a serious project and having chosen such an admirable player profile. Sonsol, who had 
been insisting that only the result mattered, named the solidarity of the group as Tabárez’s 
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biggest virtue and stated that “as Tabárez said in one of his press conferences, one cannot 
be so perverse as to just celebrate World Cup titles.”  45
 On the day after their return from South Africa, Tabárez and the team paraded 
from the team’s training complex to the Legislative Palace on a bus that was decorated 
with the slogan Orgullo Celeste. The thirty kilometer trip lasted five hours due to the sea 
of people that engulfed the bus as it made its way through the Montevideo streets.  Once 46
at the Legislative Palace, the President of Uruguay, José Mujica, greeted and welcomed 
the team, before allowing the players to talk, sing, and tell jokes to the massive crowd 
that had gathered in front of the stage. Tabárez closed the ceremony with a reminder that 
the results only served to legitimize a process that had been underway for almost four 
years. Before thanking the crowd, he stated that “success is not only the result, but the 
difficulties one endures, the continuous efforts, the spirit to take on new challenges, and 
the will to overcome them. The journey is the reward.”  His closing statement was a 47
reminder to the Uruguayan people to not depend on the final score for happiness and a 
source of identity as they had in the past, but to recognize and enjoy “effort above titles, 
garra over wins, and soccer over victory laps.”   48
 After the fourth place finish in the 2010 World Cup and the 2011 Copa América 
victory, Tabárez and the players were recognized for their success in transmitting positive 
values to the public and for showing the Uruguayan people what those values, such as 
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hard work, respect, solidarity, and discipline, could achieve.  Tabárez was named 49
“Champion for Sport” by UNESCO “in recognition of his commitment to promote 
education and sport programs for vulnerable children in Uruguay, his charitable activities 
in the framework of the Tabárez Project, and his dedication to the ideals and aims of the 
Organization.”  The players’ Uruguayaness was no longer questioned— in fact, it was 50
celebrated. The players were recognized for “personifying the basic values of the 
Uruguayan culture” after their performance at the 2010 World Cup and honored by the 
Uruguayan Post Office after their 2011 Copa América victory for “being examples of the 
values that make up the country.”  They were praised for being good role models for the 51
rest of society, especially kids. In 2013, two years after their Copa América victory, 
Selección de Valores y Actitudes: Para educar con ejemplo (National Team of Values and 
Attitudes: To educate by example), an educational book about the values exemplified by 
the Uruguayan squad was published and distributed for free to educational centers around 
Uruguay. The book used the national team’s solidarity and teamwork to teach about 
behavior.  In sharp contrast with past players that had been portrayed as arrogant stars 52
and traitors, these players were admired and respected for their characters and value 
systems. 
 Uruguayans had begun to identify with the Uruguayan players, the team, and the 
coach, rather than the idea of a distant and successful past. As Ricardo Piñeyrua, a sports 
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journalist, explained, they went “from feeling obliged to win to trying to win,” and 
realized that “the result (was) no longer the only goal, and that the image and, more so, 
the behavior also matter(ed).”  Triumphs had always played a role in the national 53
identity, but thanks to the Tabárez process, losses, challenges, and controversies also 
began to be seen as experiences that contributed to the national identity. For decades, 
Uruguayans had failed to adjust their expectations to the new globalized soccer world, 
leading to disappointment and disapproval of players. Tabárez’s emphasis on the non-
soccer aspects of players allowed the public to identify with the team rather than the idea 
of glory, allowing a new reference point for Uruguayan soccer to emerge. 
 Uruguayans’ acceptance of the players as part of the “us” rather than the “them”, 
as true mirrors of society, was showcased during the 2014 World Cup. On June 24, 2014, 
Luis Suárez bit the Italian defender Giorgio Chellini in a first-round World Cup match. 
Some Uruguayans claimed he had not bitten the player, some claimed he had, but that it 
was not a huge deal, and others, albeit fewer, condemned it as a barbaric act. When FIFA 
announced the penalty for the bite, the country rallied around the player.  FIFA kicked 54
Suárez out of the tournament, banned him from the national team for almost two years, 
and forbid him from entering any soccer field for four months. Even those that had 
condemned the biting rushed to defend Suárez against what they viewed as a large 
corporation making an example out of a player that lacked a powerful association to 
defend him.  For Uruguayans, Suárez vs. FIFA was David vs. Goliath. Daniel Renfrew, 55
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an anthropologist, explained that “defending Suárez turned into a national cause, 
regardless of what people thought of his actions on the field that day…Suárez has 
garra…and he is us.”  For the Round of 16 match, a television company set up a screen 56
outside of Suárez’s home for the more than a thousand fans that were standing in 
solidarity out in the cold. The fans held up a banner that read “3 million sky-blue hearts, 6 
million arms to help you back up”, stickers that said “We are all Suárez”, and Suárez 
masks that had been printed that day under a newspaper headline that read “we are all 
one”. Even after the game ended in a loss, the crowds cheered “Let’s go Uruguay” and 
“Olé, olé, olé, olé, Lucho! Lucho!”.  Uruguayans did not blame Suárez for the World 57
Cup elimination; they saw him, a millionaire soccer player, as a small, weak Uruguayan, 
that was a victim of the powerful, outside world. 
 The Round of 16 elimination in the 2014 World Cup, which more than one 
thousand Uruguayans watched outside of Suárez’s home, was the equivalent of the 1990 
result that had led to the firing of Tabárez and the tension of the repatriados crisis. The 
poor result could have undermined the Tabárez project and the relationship between 
players and fans again, but instead, the Uruguayans’ reaction to the 2014 World Cup 
elimination was one of support. More than 4,000 people went to the Montevideo airport 
to welcome the players home from Brazil.  In an article describing the warm reception, 
the journalist Diego Pérez wrote: 
 “if one tells somewhere else in the world that four thousand Uruguayans welcomed the 
team…after a Round of 16 elimination…few would understand it. But this group has 
achieved that. There is an identification between the pueblo and this team, or even more 
 Ibid. 56
 “Mañana, todos somos Suárez,” El Observador, June 23, 2014. 57
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so, with this process… If today there is such fervor for la Celeste, it is because these 
players have, with their attitudes outside of the field, earned affinity and recognition that 
goes further than winning or losing.”58
The reaction of the Uruguayans to the Suárez Case and the 2014 World Cup elimination 
demonstrated that the relationship built between players and fans under Tabárez was no 
longer entirely dependent on results. The fans identified with the team and players rather 
than purely the glory. In the face of losses, they did not question the dedication and 
passion of their players even in the face of an international controversy, but instead 
identified with their effort and challenges.   
 “Más de 4.000 personas recibieron a la selección,” El País, June 30, 2014.  58
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Conclusion 
 Soccer played a central role in Uruguay’s national identity throughout the 20th 
century. The national team’s triumphs in the first half of the century were seen as proof 
that the small nation could perform on a world stage. The mutually reinforcing 
relationship between soccer success and national identity weakened after 1950 when the 
national team stopped winning and when it entered into profound crisis in the 1990s as 
Uruguayan star players began leaving the country to play in better leagues abroad. The 
national team no longer provided the country with glory and the players were no longer 
mirrors of Uruguayan society. Through his 2006 project, Tabárez tackled both of these 
problems. First, he implemented institutional reforms to modernize Uruguayan soccer 
and assure continuity and youth development. Second, by reinventing the image of the 
national team, Tabárez created a new relationship between players and fans. He 
reconstructed the relationship within the context of global commercialization by showing 
that transnational players could still be national representatives and members of the 
nation — the physical distance separating the players and the country did not diminish 
their contribution to Uruguay’s national identity. Third, Tabárez emphasized that triumphs 
were not the only stories that contributed to Uruguay’s shared sense of nationhood and 
thus, that challenges and failures after valiant struggle could also contribute to the 
country’s national identity. By deemphasizing physical space and triumphs as constitutive 
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for the nation, Tabárez reshaped the relationship between soccer and national identity in 
Uruguay. 
 Uruguay was one of the best teams in the world in the first half of the twentieth 
century, winning two Olympic gold medals and two World Cups. The second half of the 
century, however, saw the Uruguayan national team falter; the team lost its international 
competitiveness and failed to even qualify for many of the World Cup tournaments. 
Paradoxically, at the turn of the century, even after decades of poor results, Uruguayans 
continued to base their expectations on the glories of the past rather than the reality of the 
present; this was due to the fact the Uruguayan national identity was not connected to 
soccer in general, but soccer success specifically. Instead of recognizing that the machine 
itself was outdated, Uruguayans blamed the individual parts for the lack of effort. After 
each disappointment, rather than looking for the root of the problem, such as the poor 
infrastructure or the organizational chaos of the Uruguayan Football Association, 
Uruguayans blamed the players who held contracts abroad.  This friction between players 
and fans was due to the disconnect created by the players’ transfers abroad — putting on 
the sky-blue jersey was not enough to convince fans that the national team players were 
passionate and dedicated Uruguayans. Uruguay’s national soccer association did not 
adapt to the changes brought about by global commercialization of soccer until Tabárez 
became head coach in 2006. Tabárez understood the roots of the Uruguayan national 
team’s lack of success and initiated reforms on two fronts. 
  He initiated both tactical and technical changes to tackle the team’s systemic 
problems and to make it competitive within the globalized, commercialized world of 
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soccer. Before Tabárez, it was unclear whether a small country like Uruguay could 
compete with larger, wealthier countries at all in the globalized and commercialized 
context. Tabárez showed that with adaptations and careful, long-term planning it was 
possible. Rather than pushing against it or ignoring it, Tabárez accepted the new reality 
brought about by global commercialization and implemented standardized policies, 
practice routines, and tactics to adapt to it. Tabárez also redesigned the Uruguayan youth 
division to better fit the new reality. He connected all young players with potential to the 
Uruguayan national team early on and then followed their development abroad to 
determine which players would serve Uruguay best. He recognized that while Uruguayan 
clubs could produce top players, they could not help them mature and become elite 
soccer players due to a lack of resources. Tabárez showed that Uruguay could be 
competitive in the globalized, commercialized game by adapting and taking advantage of 
some of its aspects, such as the European clubs’ elite player development. His success 
proved that Uruguay could adapt to and accept the new reality of soccer without 
sacrificing the cohesiveness and Uruguayan nature of the national team. 
 Tabárez’s also worked to reconcile the national identity with the new globalized 
reality of soccer by changing the team’s culture. Several of Tabárez’s reforms helped 
reinvent the connection between the national team and Uruguayans in the new global 
context, so that the team could still have a role in constructing Uruguay’s shared sense of 
nationhood. The increase in focus on the youth divisions, television coverage of youth 
games, and successful results of Uruguay’s U-15, U-17, and U-20 teams in international 
tournaments allowed Uruguayans to associate the youth players with the sky-blue jersey 
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from an early age. Fans began to see these players as potential members of the national 
team before they even moved to Europe; this meant that Uruguayans could follow their 
transfer abroad, watch them develop, and monitor their improvement all in hopes that 
they would one day be good enough to join the national squad. Uruguayans followed the 
actions of their players abroad with the national team in mind; this challenged the old 
version of national identity that depended on proximity and space.   
 Through his reforms, which took advantage of modern technology, Tabárez 
deemphasized the relationship between space and national identity by showing that the 
players did not need to be in Uruguay to be Uruguayan. Essentially, Tabárez taught 
Uruguayans to accept that players in the age of globalized soccer live as transmigrants. 
Tabárez required the players to act and communicate in a Uruguayan way, but he also 
took advantage of aspects of global commercialization itself. The media attention and 
press conferences that had previously detrimentally affected the image of the players 
were utilized to showcase players’ positive value systems and Uruguayan demeanor. 
Similarly, the technology that had led to the decline of the country’s domestic club league 
became a tool that benefitted the Uruguayan national team; the commercials, 
sponsorships, social media, and television shows worked to show fans that even though 
the players had left the country at a young age, they were still invested in Uruguayan 
society. The fact that players’ training facilities, playing strategies, and standards of living 
were becoming more European was less threatening since the players were mirrors of 
Uruguayan society in attitude, behavior, and values. By constructing a new team image, 
Tabárez tamed the critiques against the players and revitalized the relationship between 
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the people and the team. He encouraged Uruguayans to see their players as part of the 
Uruguayan collectivity rather than outsiders; Uruguayans began to see the members of La 
Celeste like the Chileans saw their players, as transmigrants.  
 Tabárez also deemphasized the relationship between glory and national identity 
by encouraging realistic expectations and the concept of “the journey is the reward”. In 
the past, Uruguayans had identified with the early glory days; the shared experiences that 
had created the dynamic between national identity and soccer had all been triumphs, so 
that is what Uruguayans demanded from the national team. In the new globalized and 
commercialized reality, the Uruguayan national team could not be expected to win the 
World Cup every time. If the fans maintained their unrealistic, high expectations and only 
identified the national team with glory, the reinvigorated relationship between fans and 
players would be short lived. Tabárez recognized this and explicitly encouraged fans to 
begin to identify with the team and their efforts instead of the results. The players were 
embraced not because they were champions, but because they represented the Uruguayan 
society each time they stepped onto the field, be it for nation or club. This cultivated a 
fanbase that was more emotionally attached to the team than to the victories, thus 
providing more leeway to the coaches and players to bring about positive results. 
Tabárez’s reforms assured that Uruguayans saw players as transmigrants, not 
“foreigners”, and that as a result, they identified with their challenges and efforts rather 
than championships.  
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The Current State and Future of the Uruguayan National Team 
 The question many fans and observers ask is whether the success that came with 
the Tabárez reforms is there to last. At first glance, it certainly appears to be the case. In 
its first match of the 2018 World Cup South American Qualifiers in October 2015, 
Uruguay beat Bolivia in La Paz for the first time in history. The games that followed 
included two victories, 3-0 wins against Colombia and Chile, and a narrow 2-1 loss to 
Ecuador in Quito. These results were impressive, not least because the matches were 
played without Luis Suárez, the country’s top all-time scorer, due to his ban from the 
2014 World Cup. The team’s success without its big star supported Tabárez’s message 
that “no one is more than anyone else”, as the Uruguayans like to say; the national team 
is about the group, not individual stars. After Suárez’s return to the national team after a 
two year absence, Uruguay tied Brazil 2-2 in Recife and beat Peru 1-0 in Montevideo. It 
looks very likely that Uruguay will qualify for the 2018 World Cup, which would be the 
first time since 1974 that Uruguay has qualified for three consecutive World Cups.  
 The future beyond the 2018 World Cup is less certain, however. Tabárez has 
created a team that the Uruguayan people have become invested in; most Uruguayans 
believe that this group is composed of true Uruguayans that passionately defend the sky-
blue jersey and represent the Uruguayan society. The fans trust this team and have stuck 
by its side through good and bad moments. The relationship between the fans and the 
team has not suffered as some standout players have left the national squad. Diego 
Forlán, the Most Valuable Player from the 2010 World Cup, and Diego Lugano, the team 
captain, were two of the faces of the successes in 2010 and 2011, but as they retired, the 
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fans supported the new leaders: Luis Suárez and Edinson Cavani as the new team 
forwards, José Maria Giménez as the new central defender, and Diego Godín as the new 
captain. Importantly, all of the new players had something in common; they had come up 
through Tabárez’s youth divisions and represented the type of player he wanted. The 
central questions are: will that continue after the 2018 World Cup when Tabárez is 71, his 
contract runs out, and he does not sign on for another four years? Will the Uruguayan 
Football Association maintain his reforms? Will the players continue to fit his player 
profile? Will the public continue to support them? 
 The Uruguayan Football Association will likely not maintain all of Tabárez’s 
reforms after his exit unless the public demands it. During the ten years that Tabárez was 
coach, there were five different Uruguayan Football Association presidents; Tabárez had 
to convince each one to keep supporting the project. Each time that executives tried to cut 
the budget for the youth divisions or attempted to push Tabárez out, they met public 
uproar. This was due to the high popularity of the Tabárez process that was rooted in the 
team’s success, but also in Tabárez’s personal integrity. Tabárez had the players’ adhesion 
and the fans’ support before even the 2010 World Cup; it was the respect and trust that he 
instilled in those two groups that pressured the Uruguayan Football Association to stand 
behind him and his reforms each time that the budget was tight or results were not great. 
After Tabárez’s exit, it will become clear whether the fans’ trust lies in the reforms 
themselves or in the old, philosophical coach, El Maestro. If the fans have become 
adherents of his process and they continue to pressure the Uruguayan Football 
Association to prolong it, then the success of the Tabárez years may continue. However, 
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if the fans belief is in Tabárez and “Tabárez’s players”, solely, and not in the “Tabárez 
process”, then the “Tabárez era” will likely be followed by a decline of the Uruguayan 
national team. The uncertainty over the future of the Uruguayan national team arises from 
the realization that each aspect of the current national team revolves around, as is shown 
by the translated sayings presented in the previous sentence, a man that will likely no 
longer be the coach in two years. 
 The national association’s finances only add to the worry that it will be unwilling 
to continue many of Tabárez’s reforms if fans do not demand that they continue once 
Tabárez leaves. In January 2016, Mario Rebollo, Tabárez’s assistant, revealed that the 
national team coaches had not been paid for four months or for any of their games in 
2015, including friendlies, Copa América games, and World Cup Qualifiers.  Two months 1
later, it was announced that the national association was still behind on the coaches’ 
salaries and that it did not have the money to pay, because it was two million dollars short 
in its budget due the freezing of Full Play’s, the company that was to pay the national 
association for the television rights for the World Cup Qualifiers, assets as a result of the 
FIFA corruption scandal.  Without Tabárez there to insist on the importance of long-term 2
investment, it is possible that money woes could lead to cuts in the low (short-term) profit 
areas, such as the youth divisions, and decreased funding to high cost areas, such as 
comfortable travel. Cuts like these would imperil the progress made by Tabárez’s 
institutional reforms, but also the new dynamic between national identity and soccer. For 
“La AUF nos debe 4 meses, es una falta de respeto,” República.com.uy, January 9, 2016.1
 “Se le debe a Tabárez, los clubes se endeudan, y la AUF no tiene plata,” Referi, March 15, 2016.2
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example, if the youth are not taught the expected behavior and tactical orientation of La 
Celeste or if players do not have comfortable working conditions, they may not perform 
at the same level in Uruguay as they do abroad. This could once again lead to the 
wrongful allegations of lack of passion and dedication to Uruguay and the breakdown of 
the player-fan relationship. However, if the Uruguayan Football Association recognizes 
the benefits of long-term investment and protects Tabárez’s reforms from future budget 
cuts, then then the gains made under Tabárez will continue.  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